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This thesis contends that in wars between nations, there is a link between 
developments at sea and the character of the land campaign. When war occurs 
in the littoral area, command of the sea offers advantages to the military 
commander ashore. Specific advantages include: mobility .of troops and 
logistics, operational initiative, improved geographic access, and surprise. Naval 
superiority alone does not guarantee these advantages. The superior naval force 
must first concentrate and win command of the sea before that command can be 
exercised. It is only in the exercise of command of the sea that these 
advantages are realized. 
Background for supporting these contentions is provided by defining 
pertinent concepts such as maritime power, sea power, naval power, sea force, 
and littoral warfare. Next, the American Revolutionary War is analyzed with a 
focus on the interaction of land and sea forces. An attempt is made to associate 
changes in the character of the land campaign with changes in the naval 
condition between belligerents. 
Linkage is established between events at sea and ashore, and the conclusion 
is that the character of the land campaign can be influenced ... From the Sea. 
V 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
During the American Revolutionary War, Great Britain 
was the world's foremost military and naval power. The 
dominant position of Great Britain in the world community, 
however, was challenged in distant war by a rebellious group 
of loosely organized colonies in the New World. Initially, 
there seemed little chance that this challenge would survive 
a full campaign season by the British forces. While they 
delighted in Britain's preoccupation with the nuisance in 
the Americas, her traditional European enemies balked at 
openly supporting the Rebellion because the odds of success 
seemed very slim. It would require a demonstration of 
Colonial military competence in the field against British 
regulars to precipitate open support from France. The 
capture of General Burgoyne's Army at Saratoga provided just 
such a demonstration. 
It is true that the Colonists required allied support 
to overcome British military power and eventually prevail in 
the conflict. The question remains, however, "How did the 
Continental Army, largely raw and tactically unsophisti- 
cated, come to capture a British Army, then win the war?" 
The primary motivation for answering this question is 
that the United States finds itself in a situation similar 
to the one faced by Britain two hundred years ago. Today, 
the United States is the dominant military and naval power 
in the world. Uses of expeditionary forces by the United 
States since the collapse of the Soviet Union has been in 
disorganized and relatively primitive political areas such 
as Somalia and Haiti. These areas are similar to the 
political/military situation in the Colonies in 1775. The 
motivation then, for explaining Britain's defeat at the 
ix 
hands of the Colonists, is to keep the United States from 
repeating the same mistakes. 
To that end, this thesis conducts an analysis of 
certain military aspects of the American Revolutionary War. 
The specific focus is to consider the impact that changes in 
the naval situation have on developments ashore. The 
contention is that command of the littoral sea grants to the 
shore commander certain advantages, such as: mobility for 
troops and logistics, the ability to concentrate, improved 
geographic access, and surprise. The admonition is-that 
unless command of the sea is actively exercised, then those 
advantages are lost. 
The events of the war support both the contention and 
the admonition. Campaigns for the Lake Champlain waterway, 
Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Yorktown are all 
considered in light of the interactions of armies and 
navies. Lessons from each of the campaigns indicate that 
the character of the land campaign is indeed influenced by 
developments at sea. Yorktown conclusively demonstrates the 
importance of joint operations. Without allied command of 
the sea, as provided by the French Navy, the British Army 
could likely have avoided a war-ending defeat by the 
Continental Army almost indefinitely. 
X 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. THESIS CONTENTIONS 
1. In war between nations, there is a link between 
developments at sea and the character of the land campaign. 
That link is more direct and observable in littoral warfare 
than it is in other types of naval warfare, notably "blue 
water" operations. 
increase military options for commanders ashore in 
prosecuting the land campaign. These options equate to 
advantages that can be used to increase the efficiency of 
the land campaign. 
3. Specific advantages available to the military 
commander that result from command of the littoral sea are: 
mobility, initiative, access, and surprise. Having secured 
command of the littoral sea, failure to exercise it negates 
the associated advantages and is equivalent to a condition 
of command in dispute. Naval superiority does not neces- 
sarily equate to command of the sea, and command of the sea 
by no means equates to the effective exercise of that 
command. 
2 .  Command of the littoral sea and its pro;Der exercise 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop guidelines 
for the employment of naval power in the littoral that 
produce advantages to forces ashore in prosecuting the land 
campaign. Such guidelines are useful for the U.S. Navy 
today as it shifts mission emphasis from operations on the 




The method consists of reviewing a war characterized by 
two things: first, major changes in the character of the 
land campaign; second, the shifting of naval superiority 
between belligerents in the littoral area. For the purposes 
of analysis, major changes in the land campaign are 
considered the dependent v a r i a b l e ,  while shifts in naval 
superiority between belligerents are the inhependent 
v a r i a b l e .  A cause-effect relationship is argued between the 
two variables and examples of their interaction are examined 
to determine the nature of that relationship. 
ship is sufficiently well-understood so that the desired 
effect can be attained by manipulating the cause. That is, 
a specific advantage can be made available to the land 
campaigners by varying a naval condition. A summary of the 
method follows. 
The objective is met when the nature of the relation- 
2. Step-By-Step Process 
a. Case Selection 
The case selected for detailed examination is the 
American Revolutionary War. The rationale for selection of 
this particular historical event appears below. 
b. Ident i fy  the Variables 
(1) Dependent Variables. The dependent 
variables in this analysis consist of instances during the 
land war in which major changes in military objectives 
occurred. Examples of such changes include but are not 
limited to: initiation of an entirely new military campaign, 
perhaps in a different geographic area, or a significant 
change of military objectives within an existing campaign. 
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These changes in direction are hereafter referred to as 
"departure points". 
(2) Independent Variables. The independent 
variables in this analysis consist of instances during the 
war in which shifts in the naval condition between 
belligerents occurred. Examples include shifts in: naval 
superiority, command of the sea, and the manner in which 
command is exercised. Another independent variable to be 
considered is use of a sea commanded by the enemy. 
c. Identify Causes of Departure Points - 
Changes in the naval condition between belli- 
gerents are not the only factors that affect the character 
of the land campaign. An honest effort must be made to 
identify all the factors that may have contributed to the 
existence of a departure point. In addition to changes in 
the naval condition, other factors that may contribute to 
the existence of departure points include: newly appointed 
commanders in the field; policy changes at home, 
intelligence updates, weather, logistics, tactical 
innovation, new technology, etc. All these factors and more 
are capable of precipitating a departure point. It is 
possible for these factors to mask or skew the pertinent 
data, which is the impact of naval developments on the 
existence of a departure point. 
possibility, an attempt is made to account for the impact of 
each factor on the existence of a departure point. 
d.  Distill the Meaningful Data; Analyze 
The overall objective is to determine the manner 
in which naval power can be employed to provide advantages 
in prosecuting the land campaign. To this point in the 
methodology, an association has been made between a 
departure point and the many factors that may have caused 
it. The next step is to isolate the naval factor from the 
To minimize this 
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others, and analyze its influence. Episodes in which naval 
power is the dominant factor in precipitating change in a 
land campaign are emphasized. This process establishes the 
basis of a cause-effect relationship between land and sea 
forces. Understanding this relationship is a critical step 
toward the overall objective of effectively employing naval 
power to enhance the prosecution of the land campaign. 
8.  Draw Conclusions and m d a t e  Accordingly 
Once the pertinent information has been isolated 
and analyzed, conclusions are drawn with respect to-the 
relationship that existed between land and sea forces for 
the period examined. Based on this relationship, a set of 
principles for optimizing the use of naval force in 
influencing the prosecution of the land campaign is 
advanced. 
D. RELEVANCE 
1. General Relevance 
As stated, the overall objective is to establish 
guidelines for the effective employment of naval forces in 
the littoral seas to positively influence the prosecution of 
the land campaign. This objective is made relevant by the 
content of the U.S. Navy's most recent statement of 
organizational vision: F o r w a r d .  . .From the Seal.  This 
document indicates that joint warfare in the littoral will 
be the main feature of naval operations through the end of 
this century. 
littoral warfare. Thus, a study of the relationship between 
Joint warfare cannot be separated from 
'Secretary of the Navy John H. Dalton, F o r w a r d . .  .From the 
Sea:  (Washington, D . C . :  U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. 
GPO], 1994), p. 1. 
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land and sea forces in the littoral is a relevant topic 
because it pertains to current policy directives of the U.S. 
Navy. 
2. Case Relevance 
The American Revolutionary War is considered a relevant 
candidate for analysis for the reasons listed below: 
a. Naval Mismatch 
The Revolutionary War matched the world's leading 
naval power against a nation with virtually no navy at the 
outbreak of hostilities. This situation has modern- 
application in that the naval forces of the U.S. are far 
stronger than those of any regional power today. 
b. An Abundance of Variables 
The character of the land campaigns of both 
belligerents changed several times during the course of the 
war, as did command of the sea. This provides several 
opportunities to trace possible linkages between the two 
events . 
c. Qperations Characterized by Littoral Warfare 
Due to the geography of North America and the 
as yet undeveloped inland transportation infrastructure, 
much of the action in the Revolutionary War necessarily 
occurred in the littoral and along inland waterways. This 
has modern application as the U.S. Navy shifts emphasis away 
from operations on the sea to operations . . .  From the Sea. 
d. An Abundance of Joint Interaction 
Because the littoral area is the common between 
land and sea forces, there is a strong association between 
littoral warfare and joint warfare. 
operations were largely confined to the littoral, this 
conflict provides several excellent examples for the study 
of joint operations which, in turn, provide opportunities to 
study the interaction between land and sea forces. 
Since Revolutionary War 
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e. Readily Observable Linkage 
The Revolutionary War contains several episodes 
in which dramatic changes ashore for both belligerents can 
be traced to shifts in the naval condition. 
f. Examglary Joint Leadership 
The responsibility for coordinating Colonial 
land and sea forces fell to a single commander, General 
George Washington. He proved himself a most able commander 
in both arenas and, more importantly, a master of blending 
them into joint operations. His mastery of the disciplines 
of both general and admiral have implications for today's 
armed forces which are increasingly characterized by highly 
specialized skills and frequently wasteful interservice 
rivalry. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this thesis is divided into four 
chapters: 
Chapter I1 Background 
Chapter I11 Historical Narrative 
Chapter IV Discussion 
Chapter V Conclusions 
Chapter I1 introduces concepts related to littoral 
warfare and the interaction of land/sea forces. It covers a 
broad spectrum of maritime thought, and is intended to 
introduce and clarify the language of analysis used in 





The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the con- 
cepts related to both littoral warfare and the interaction 
of land and sea forces. These concepts include maritime 
power, sea power, naval power, naval warfare, and littoral 
warfare itself. 
highlight their relationship, and facilitate understanding 
of intended meanings as they are used in analysis that 
follows. These concepts are developed with an emphasis on 
those aspects that relate to the interaction of land and sea 
forces . 
because historians have used them to describe different 
phenomena over the course of many centuries. In so doing, 
wide variations in time, technology, and circumstance have 
resulted in substantial variation in definitions and 
terminology. To eliminate the resultant confusion, this 
chapter develops precise definitions so that intended 
meanings are clear. 
Comparing and contrasting these concepts 
Clarification of these terms and concepts is necessary 
B. OVERVIEW 
1. The U.S. Navy in Transition 
A review of the foundations of sea power with the 
objective of identifying lessons for the future is made 
timely by the fact that the U.S. Navy has recently shifted 
mission emphasis from open-ocean operations to littoral 
operations'. This shift is fundamental and impacts on all 
'Secretary of the Navy, . . .From the Sea:  Preparing the Naval 
S e r v i c e  for the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: U . S .  Government 
Printing Office [U.S. GPO], 1992, p. 2.  
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aspects of maritime affairs from procurement and logistics 
to policy and doctrine. Because of this broad impact, a 
thorough understanding of littoral warfare requires 
illumination of closely related concepts that directly 
affect it. These concepts are developed in detail in this 
chapter. 
2. Reasons for the Transition 
The demise of the Soviet Union was the political 
development that marked the end of a bipolar international 
system dominated by the two superpowers. Since that time, 
regional powers have emerged and the international order has 
changed its bipolar character to a more multi-polar 
orientation. The nature of the challenge for U.S. naval 
forces has shifted in a manner that reflects the change in 
the international system. The Soviet fleet no longer 
challenges U.S. naval dominance around the globe, and the 
Soviet Union is no longer viewed as the sole enemy. In 
fact, there is currently no open-ocean challenge to U.S. 
naval dominance. Along with the political redistribution of 
power, the naval threat has taken on a regional character 
and is more diffuse than during the Cold War era. 
U.S. Navy is in a position to support other than "blue 
water" national policy objectives. Naval planners have 
decided that support of land operations in the littoral is 
the current best use of naval assets in achieving those 
policy objectives. . . .  From the Sea was written to explain 
and direct this shift from global, open-ocean operations to 
regional, littoral operations2. 
With unchallenged dominance of the world's oceans, the 
'Edward A .  Smith, Capt., USN, "What '...From the Sea' Didn't 
Say," Naval War College Review, Volume XLVIII, Number 1 (Winter 
1995) : 9-34. 
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A changing international environment precipitated the 
shift, but several major concepts must be understood to 
firmly establish the relationship between the Soviet 
collapse and the subsequent shift of American naval power 
toward the littoral. The concepts that link and explain 
these events include: maritime power, sea power, naval 
power, naval warfare, and finally littoral warfare. Each is 
considered below. 
C. MAHAN AND CORBETT 
1. Overview 
A discussion of the roots of modern, Western sea power 
is incomplete if it is not based on the theories of Alfred 
Thayer Mahan and Julian S. Corbett. Their books3 codify the 
very foundations of Western naval theory, and are referred 
to extensively by more recent authors in the field. In 
addition to the importance of their books, Mahan and Corbett 
are further pertinent to this discussion because of the 
emphasis placed by each man on the proper use of naval 
power. The position of each man corresponds roughly to the 
poles that define the transition of the U.S. Navy today. 
Mahan was a confirmed navalist who emphasized open-ocean 
operations and decisive fleet engagements. This emphasis is 
analogous to the war-fighting scenarios of the two 
superpowers during the Cold War. For his part, Corbett 
recognized that mode of employment for navies as well, but 
he allowed for alternate uses of naval power that include 
3Major works of A.T. Mahan include: The I n f l u e n c e  o f  Sea 
Power Upon History, 1660-1783; The Major Operat ions o f  the N a v i e s  
i n  the War o f  American Independence; The  I n f l u e n c e  o f  Sea Power 
Upon the French Revo lu t ion  and Empire, 1783-1812; The R e l a t i o n s  
of Sea Power t o  the War of 1812; and Naval S t r a t e g y .  Major works 
of Sir Julian S. Corbett include: Some Principles o f  Mari t ime 
S t r a t e g y ;  Drake and the Tudor Navy; England i n  the Mediterranean;  
England i n  the Seven Years  War; and The  Campaign of T r a f a l g a r .  
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littoral warfare. A discussion of the transition from open- 
ocean to littoral operations therefore lends itself well to 
a consideration of the writings of Mahan and Corbett. Brief 
biographical summaries accompany the major naval theories of 
each man in the following paragraphs. 
2 .  Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) 
a. Biographical Overview 
Mahan was born in 1840 in West Point, New York, 
where his father, a career Army officer, was an instructor. 
There was no indication until late in his naval career that 
Mahan would be recognized as one of the world's leading 
naval thinkers. As a lieutenant commander in 1866, Mahan 
reported to the steam sloop IROQUOIS on an Asiatic cruise. 
It was during this three year period that Mahan began the 
systematic perusal of history which was to be a lifelong 
habit. 
in 1884 with the founding of the U.S. Naval War College for 
the advanced study of naval matters and international law. 
Commodore Luce, with whom Mahan had served aboard ship in 
the early 1860s, was the first president of the War College 
and asked him to join the teaching staff to direct work in 
strategy, tactics, and history. In 1886, Mahan succeeded 
Luce as president of the college. From this office, Mahan 
evolved his concept of sea power and its influence on the 
development of nations. 
ideas and the lecture notes were eventually combined into a 
manuscript and published in 1890 under the title, The 
Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1 783. 
Mahan's career as a naval thinker began in earnest 
He used the classroom to refine his 
4William E. Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power (Norman: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1947), p. 8-9. 
sibid. 
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b. Pertinent Concepts 
Interpreting Mahan has been a preoccupation for 
legions of naval theorists in many nations for more than a 
hundred years. Concepts codified by Mahan that are perti- 
nent to a discussion of interactions between land and sea 
forces, and littoral warfare, are considered below. 
Sea Power Upon History is Mahan's best known work, and it 
continues to spark controversy. In this book, Mahan 
articulates the theme that forms the theoretical basis for 
the American shift away from isolationist continentalism and 
a defensive naval strategy to one that was politically 
imperialistic and strategically offensive. 
extremely influential with many powerful Americans such as 
Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt.6 
Mahan's theme: 
(1) Sea Power and History. The Influence o f  
His work was 
The following citation goes to the heart of 
In these three things: production7, with the 
necessity of exchanging products; shipping, whereby 
the exchange is carried on; and colonies, which 
facilitate and enlarge the operations of shipping 
and tend to protect it by multiplying the points of 
safety--is to be found the key to much of the 
history, as well as of the policy, of nations 
bordering upon the sea.' 
In this citation, Mahan links the production 
of goods to commerce as a means of exchanging those goods. 
6ibid., p. 47.. 
7NOTE: Production implies both manufactured goods and raw 
materials. With England as the manufacturing center of the 
empire, shipping raw materials was as economically important as 
the subsequent transport of finished products. 
1660-1783 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1890), p. 28. 
'Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Seapower Upon History 
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Surplus goods are of questionable value unless they can be 
exchanged. He then includes overseas bases as a facilitator 
of commerce, making trade more convenient and providing 
points of safety. The interaction of production, commerce, 
and overseas bases is then identified as a key to history 
for states bordering the sea. 
More than the thoughts of a simple sailor, 
Mahan's theory served as a rationalization for governments 
seeking to justify the colonial expansion of the 18th and 
19th centuries. More importantly, it served as a guiding 
beacon to governments charting the course of great nations 
throughout the twentieth century. Not only the United 
States, but Germany, Japan, Italy, the Soviet Union, and 
Britain referred to the theories of Mahan in developing 
modern navies and maritime policy. His thought is reflected 
in the behavior of all great naval powers of this century. 
Mahan's theories and apply them to their own situation 
represents a misreading of the lessons of sea power. The 
period on which he focused in The Influence o f  Sea Power 
Upon History was 1660-1783. Not only was the period 
limited, but the analysis centered on Great Britain and was 
aimed at explaining her rise to great nation status within 
the international community. Britain's circumstances of 
geography, population, and government were unique and the 
lessons drawn from the study are best applied to that 
specific situation. Despite this fact, Mahan came to exert 
great personal influence across the globe because his 
theories were popularly accepted and applied. 
was particularly seductive to nations that aspire to 
greatness, especially Wilhelmian Germany. 
it links activity ashore to activity on the oceans. The 
That so many nations were quick to adopt 
His message 
The citation above is also relevant because 
12 
I 
oceans of the world are a medium of transport for 
manufactured goods and raw materials. 
the economic v i t a l i t y  and s tandard  o f  l iv ina of a n a t i o n  
dewends uwon i t s  a b i l i t y  t o  t r a n s w o r t  aoods .  This 
connection between national interests and free movement of 
shipping is critical to the central contentions of this 
thesis. 
To varying degrees, 
(2) Navalism. Since the free flow of goods 
is a national interest, it is but a short leap to accept the 
proposition that protection is one of the primary missions 
of fighting ships. Naval powerg in modern times had as its 
original purpose the protection of threatened commerce: 
Protection in time of war must be extended by armed 
shipping. The necessity of a na vy... springs . . .  from 
the existence of a peaceful shipping, and 
disappears with it. lo 
Seapower, in its military sense, is the offspring, 
not the parent of commerce.11 
These citations summarize Mahan's thinking on 
the role of naval power with respect to commerce early in 
his writing career. They clearly express the opinion that 
it was in the interest of protecting transports (commercial 
or military) that war vessels found their r a i s o n  d ' e t r e .  
Mahan's views on the relationship between 
commerce and naval power changed in later years. By the 
time he published Naval S t r a t e g y  in 1897, Mahan believed 
'NOTE: Naval power is the sea-based component of seaforce. 
Seaforce is the overall capability of a nation to control passage 
upon the sea through the threat or use of force. 
"Mahan, The I n f l u e n c e  o f  Sea Power  Upon History, pp. 2 6 - 2 7 .  
'libid. 
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that naval forces had an independent role, separate and 
distinct from the protection of shipping. 
The proponent in 1890 of naval power as a creature 
of commerce, had in a few years, become an 
imperialist for whom naval strength had an 
autonomous political importance." 
"Autonomous political importance'' is a key 
phrase in this citation. Mahan's changing views paralleled 
the development of an American strategy of offensive sea 
control with a rapidly expanding navy as its executor. In 
this aggressive strategic culture, the role of the navy was 
forward power projection and the protection of commerce was 
an ancillary use of the navy.I3 
Naval War College, noted the shift in Mahan's thought and 
reemphasized that fighting ships were meant to defend 
shipping. Building on this theme, Luce stated that naval 
power is significant in the protection of shipping and 
thereafter only so far as it influences events on land.14 
contained the seeds for arguments that continue to confound 
perceptions about the proper use of naval power to this day. 
Mahan's shift toward navalism set a tone that was 
enthusiastically taken up by naval planners throughout the 
world. Educating officers about alternatives to "pure 
Admiral Luce, the first president of the U.S. 
This disagreement between Luce and Mahan 
"George W. Baer, "Under the Influence: A Hundred Years and 
Around the World. I' in John B. Hattendorf , ed. , The Influence o f  
His tory  on Mahan: The Proceedings o f  a Conference Marking the 
Centenary o f  Alfred Thayer Mahan's 'The Influence o f  Sea Power 
Upon History, 1660-1 783 (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1991) 
p. 203. 
13ibid., p. 205. 
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navalist theory" is one of the challenges facing the 
leadership of the U.S. Navy today. The Navy's transition 
from blue water operations appears inconsistent with many of 
the tenets espoused by Mahan. Those who rely on Mahanian 
theory as a reference framework are forced to adopt a new 
view of maritime affairs. The international scene differs 
dramatically from Mahan's day and the uses of naval power 
must reflect this change. The United States faces no real 
contenders for naval dominance today. Decisive, purely 
naval engagements are not the primary concern in the 1990s. 
The main objective on the high seas is maintenance of the 
international status quo, a mission that differs 
significantly from the imperialist aspirations of the 
previous century. 
naval assets in light of the diminished challenge on the 
high seas. Navalism has too narrow a focus to address the 
challenge of regionalism that characterizes the distribution 
of world power today. 
A broader view of naval power and its uses is 
supplied by the writings of Sir Julian Corbett. His 
theories are considered in the following paragraphs. 
Other useful employment must be found for 
3 .  Sir Julian Corbett (1854-1922) 
a.  Biographical Overview 
Julian Corbett was educated in law at Cambridge, 
but thanks to comfortable private circumstances, never had 
to practice seriously, preferring to travel widely and 
concentrate on the writing of naval history. His first 
published work, Drake and the Tudor Navy, appeared in 1890. 
He wrote several historical accounts of the British navy 
before his best known work, Some Principles of Maritime 
Strategy, was published in 1911. The influence of Corbett 
in naval circles in England was enhanced through his ten 
year lecture series at the Royal Naval War College and his 
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close association with Admiral Sir John Fisher, the 
architect of the ships and strategy with which Britain faced 
the German naval challenge in 1914.15 
b. Pertinent Concept 
Beyond the decisive bat t le .  
studies were aimed at bringing to light the permanent 
characteristics of seapower and the specific nature of its 
contribution to national strategy, including capabilities 
and limitations. His investigations convinced him that 
there was far more to naval warfare than the seeking and 
destroying the enemy's fleet.16 
Corbett's historical 
According to one of Corbett's interpreters: 
The Campaign of T r a f a l g a r  (1910) had emphasized 
that not even that most decisive sea victory had 
prevented Napoleon becoming the master of Europe. 
The navy must learn to use its wide range of 
capabilities to bring pressures to bear on the 
enemy which would assist the work of the army and 
further the political objectives for which the war 
was being fought. He stressed the imwortance o f  
combined owerations a s  beincr the most e f f ec t i ve  wav 
f o r  Britain t o  use her sea wower i n  a European 
war. l7 
It is his recognition of alternate uses for the 
navy, especially in combined operations, that Corbett's 
thoughts have current utility for the U.S. Navy. 
down-play the importance of command of the sea per se, but 
rather emphasized alternate uses of naval power while a 
superior fleet was unable to bring its enemy counterpart to 
He did not 
"Bryan Ranft, "Sir Julian Corbett," in Geoffrey Till, ed., 
Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, 2d ed. , (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1982), p. 39. 
16ibid., p. 40. 
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battle. 
permitted dispersal and engagement in other war-related 
activities until the enemy sortied for the decisive 
engagement. '* 
French and Spanish fleets to battle over the course of 
previous wars led Corbett to his contention that a great 
fleet cannot stand idle because the enemy can not be drawn 
into battle. 
could, in the interim, support the work of the army in 
pursuit of national objectives. 
Great Britain well understood the meaning of 
Corbett's writing on uses of the fleet, but they were unable 
to act upon it during World War I. The German surface fleet 
opted for the role of the "fleet-in-being" and refused to 
sortie for the decisive naval engagement against the British 
required the British fleet to remain in the immediate 
vicinity of England to meet any German sortie. 
Fleet was thereby preempted from pursuit of alternate 
missions by the threat of the German fleet-in-being. 
this way, an inferior German fleet occupied a numerically 
He felt that the inherent mobility of naval forces 
The inability of the British fleet to bring the 
Corbett sought other uses of naval power that 
1 
I 
, Fleet. The circumstances of geography and distance however, 
The Grand I 
In 
I 
superior British fleet as they waited for the opportunity to 
engage. l9 , 
4 .  Summary 
For more than a century, Mahan's principles have been 
central to the culture of the U . S .  Navy. 
of naval warfare have changed dramatically since Mahan, the 
Although the tools 
I 
leibid. , p.41. 
lgibid., p. 42. 
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essence of the service culture has continued to center on 
"fleet-action". The most advanced ship of its kind in the 
world, the AEGIS class cruiser embodies this style of naval 
warfare. It was designed and built to provide force 
protection through early detection and simultaneous 
engagement of regimental-size raids of Soviet attack 
aircraft. Its sensors and weapons are optimized for the 
open-ocean environment; conversely, the advantages it offers 
are diminished significantly in near-land regions. 
Similarly, the effectiveness of the Navy's anti-submarine 
warfare equipment is also diminished in the shallows of the 
littoral. The aircraft carrier, the centerpiece of U.S. 
Naval operations since World War 11, goes beyond fleet 
engagement to the power projection role. 
later chapters however, power projection and littoral 
warfare have important distinctions that relate to the 
interactions of land and sea forces. Taken as a whole, the 
platforms and equipment named above, acquired at substantial 
investment in time and opportunity cost, are evidence of the 
Mahanian culture which has characterized U.S. Naval policy 
for many decades. They have achieved their objective; but 
new thinking as well as new equipment are necessary to 
effectively transition to the littoral. 
In considering the littoral area, the writings of 
Corbett are more useful than those of Mahan. Command of the 
sea and decisive naval engagements are priorities shared by 
both men, but once the issue of command is settled, 
Corbett's theories come to the fore. Whereas Mahan 
attempted to link history and sea power, Corbett set out to 
identify, elucidate, and expand concepts relating to 
maritime war. Corbett's thinking goes beyond the problem of 
securing command and devises uses for navies when command is 
not the central issue. Corbett articulated this point in 
As will be seen in 
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the following citation: 
The object of naval warfare must always be directly 
or indirectly to secure the command of the sea or 
to prevent the enemy from securing it. Once the 
object. . .has been achieved, purely naval strategy 
is at an end, because one side is able to exercise 
control of the use of the sea. Subsequent naval 
operations are directed towards some other object, 
such as an invasion of enemy territory.20 
In this citation, Corbett considers the transition in 
mission emphasis that a navy must make after securing the 
command of the sea. The Mahanian emphasis on the destruc- 
tion of the enemy's naval weaponry must be redirected to the 
shore. As the open-ocean threat diminishes, it becomes 
increasingly important to link naval power and politico- 
military objectives ashore. Decisive engagement between 
battle fleets is too narrow a focus in today's international 
environment. Alternative uses of naval power as suggested 
by Corbett, especially joint operations, must come to the 
fore. 
Corbett also emphasizes the importance of coordinated 
land and sea forces as well as the limitations of naval 
power with respect to influencing political objectives in 
the following citation: 
For it scarcely needs saying that it is almost 
impossible that a war can be decided by naval 
action alone. Unaided, naval pressure can only 
work by a process of exhaustion. Since men live 
upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues 
between nations at war have always been decided-- 
except in-the rarest cases--either by what your 
army can do against your enemy's territory and 
national life, or else by the fear of what the 
fleet makes it possible for your army to do.21 
2oSir Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime 
Strategy (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1911), p. 18. 
21ibid., pp. 11-12. 
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D. RELATED TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
Several concepts and terms are used repeatedly in later 
chapters in a discussion of the interaction of land and sea 
power in the littoral. 
concepts is a prerequisite to meaningful discussion. 
are clarified below. 
A clear understanding of these 
They 
1. Maritime Power 
a. Definition 
Maritime power i s  the a b i l i t y  of the s ta te  to  
optimize the interaction of the constituent’parts of m a r i -  
time power w i t h  the object of securing economic advantage 
through trade i n  peacetime.” 
Constituent parts of maritime power are: 
1. a surplus/deficiency of commodities/raw 
materials 
2 .  an incentive (profit) to transport 
commodities/raw materials by sea 
3 .  overseas access to trading partners 
4 .  merchant shipping 
5. freedom of passage 
b. Discussion 
Simply stated, the components of maritime power 
include: a reason to trade; a reason to use the sea rather 
than land or air transport; a partner with whom to trade; 
the means to transport goods upon the sea; and safety from 
armed attack. 
components is a challenge that involves many aspects of a 
society far removed from the sea. 
Coordinating and optimizing this array of 
More so than any of the 
22NOTE: Maritime power continues to exist and function in 
wartime but the object of economic advantage is subordinated to 
military objectives and naval power takes-on exaggerated 
significance. 
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other concepts to be discussed, maritime power concerns 
itself with diverse, land-based organizations within the 
state during peacetime. 
The components of maritime power form an over- 
arching system whose parts are linked across a broad 
spectrum of land and sea-based institutions at the national 
level. 
factors within a state that produce either a commodity 
surplus for export or a requirement to import raw materials. 
This necessarily involves institutions that-produce-a 
commodity or supply raw materials. 
in either of these activities generates a demand for cheap 
transportation, which largely equates to transport by sea. 
In turn, seaborne trade generates its own set of national 
require-ments which include: financing, insurance, 
merchants, brokers, shipbuilding, ship repair, port 
facilities, etc. for its operation. A nation's ability and 
inclination to respond to these demands is a direct 
reflection of its maritime power.23 
that generates the impetus for maritime power. Its insti- 
tutions are diverse and, other than the transport of 
commodities by ship, many of the essential institutions for 
maritime power have little direct relation to the sea. Rear 
Admiral J.R. Hill states simply that, "Maritime power is the 
ability to use the sea."24 This definition is succinct and 
actually illuminating in light of the preceding discussion. 
Considered alone however, it leaves much for the reader to 
Maritime power is generated initially by economic 
An institution involved 
It is the creation of a need for seaborne trade 
23Wi11iam Reitzel, "Mahan On the Use of the Sea," Naval War 
24J.R. Hill, Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers (Annapolis: 
College Review, Vol. 25, No.5, (May-June 1973), pp. 73-82. 
Naval Institute Press, 1986), p. 48. 
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fill in. 
defining maritime power, as indicated in the following 
citations. 
a definition of maritime power, and reflect each of the 
constituent parts mentioned: 
Maritime powers of the world have always been those 
which have incurred responsibilities and developed 
interests over seas. As traders, they have built 
themselves merchant fleets which carried their 
goods at a greater mutual benefit than those of 
other nations. For security of this commerce and 
colonies they have needed fighting forces.25 
The components of maritime power are: trade and 
access; shipbuilding; exploitation of natural 
resources; and military power at sea.26 
Other writers address the gaps left by Hill in 
These citations are used in this thesis to build 
- 
c. Conditions Affecting Maritime Power 
Mahan also takes on the issue of maritime power 
and delineates six conditions that affect it. But he 
associates these conditions with sea power rather than 
maritime power. 
writing on closely related concepts without the benefit of 
commonly defined terms. 
has much in common with the definition of maritime power 
already presented in this chapter, especially the last two 
conditions. For that reason, they are grouped under the 
heading of maritime power. 
Mahan's principal conditions affecting the sea 
power of nations are as follows: 
This is a case of well-respected authors 
Mahan's description of sea power 
1. Geographic Pos i t ion .  . . .  If a nation be so 
situated that it is neither forced to defend itself 
by land nor induced to seek extension of its 
territory by way of the land, it has . . .  its aim 
2SAdmira1 Sir Herbert Richmond, Sea Power i n  the Modern 
26Hill, M a r i t i m e  S t ra t egy  f o r  Medium Powers ,  p. 3 0 .  
2 2  
World (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1934) p. 161. 
directed upon the sea, an advantage as compared 
with a people whose boundaries is continental. 
2. Physical Conformation. . . .  The seaboard of a 
country is one of its frontiers; and the easier the 
access offered by the frontier to the region 
beyond, . . .the greater will be the tendency of a 
people toward intercourse with the rest of the 
world by it. If a country be imagined having a 
long seaboard, but entirely without a harbor, such 
a country can have no sea trade of its own, no 
shipping, no navy. 
3. Extent of Territory. As regards the.development 
of sea power, it is not the total number of square 
miles which a country contains, but the length of 
its coast-line and the character of its harbors 
that are to be considered. The extent of sea-coast 
is a source of strength or weakness according as 
the population is large or small. A country is like 
a fortress; the garrison must be proportioned to 
the enceinte. 
4. Number of Population. ... and so in the case of 
population, it is not only the grand total, but the 
number following the sea, or at least readily 
available for the employment on ship-board and for 
the creation of naval material, that must be 
counted. 
5 .  National Character. If sea power be really based 
upon a peaceful and extensive commerce, aptitude 
for commercial pursuits must be a distinguishing 
feature of the nations that have at one time or 
another been great upon the sea. The tendency to 
trade, involving of necessity the production of 
something to trade with, is the national 
characteristic most important to the development of 
sea power. 
6 .  Character of the Government. . . .  Nevertheless, 
it must be noted that particular forms of 
government with their accompanying institutions, 
and the character of rulers at one time or another, 
have exercised a very marked influence upon the 
development of sea power.27 
27Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, pp. 2 0 - 5 3 .  
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Mahan has a great deal more to say on the manner 
in which these conditions affect the development of maritime 
power, but the passages above capture its essence. They 
emphasize the broad, overarching character of maritime power 
and the participation of many sectors of society in its 
exercise and growth. Note, that although they are key 
components of maritime power, far more than commercial and 
military ships alone are involved. 
a. D e f  i n i  t ion 
Sea power i s  the measure o f  a s t a t e ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  
use the sea i n  support o f  nat ional  o b j e c t i v e s  under 
cond i t ions  o f  b o t h  peace and war;  and t o  deny i t s  use t o  
enemies d u r i n g  h o s t i l i t i e s .  The two major components o f  sea 
power are  commercial shipping and sea force2*. 
2. Sea Power 
b. D i s c u s s i o n  
Sea power is concerned with that part of maritime 
power that relates directly to transport and security on the 
wor ld ' s  waterways. In attempting to define sea power, it 
was again found that there exists little consensus even 
among the great navalist writers as to its true nature. The 
definition that appears in paragraph (a) was build by 
identifying the most important elements of sea power as 
defined by several authoritative sources. 
that follow were used in this process. 
Sea power was by no means synonymous with naval 
power; it included not only the military strength 
afloat that ruled the sea or any part of it by 
force of arms, but equally 'the peaceful commerce 
The citations 
?Sea force is the term used to describe military systems 
that can affect control of passage through the use of force. Its 
major component is naval combatants and their associated weapons 
systems, but it also includes land-based systems such as shore 
batteries, surveillance and attack aircraft, etc. 
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and shipping from which alone a military fleet 
naturally and healthfully springs, and on which it 
securely rests ' . 2 9  
Sea power is the ability to use the seas and oceans 
for military or commercial purposes and to preclude 
an enemy from the 
The elements of sea power are by no means limited 
to combat craft, weapons, and trained personnel but 
include the shore establishment, well-sited bases, 
commercial shipping, and advantageous international 
alignments . 3 1  
Sea power enables its possessor to send his troops 
and trade across those spaces of water which lie 
between nations and the objectives of their desires 
and to prevent his opponent from doing so.32 
These citations formed the basis for the 
definition of seapower in paragraph (a). One point not 
brought out in that definition is the nature of the 
interaction between the components of sea power. This 
interaction is considered below. 
c. Interaction Between Components of Sea Power 
As stated in the definition, the components of sea 
power are commerce and sea force. The source and reward of 
sea power is the national wealth that accrues from oceanic 
trade. If the transport of goods could be more profitably 
2gMahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, p. iii. 
30Colin Gray, .The Leverage of Sea Power: The S t r a t e g i c  
Advantage o f  N a v i e s  i n  War (New York: The Free Press, 1992), p. 
ix, citing Sir Herbert Richmond, S ta te smen  and Sea Power (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1946. 
31E.B. Potter, ed., The Uni t ed  S t a t e s  and World Sea Power 
32Geoffrey Till, Mari t ime  S t r a t e g y  and the Nuc lear  Age (New 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1955), p.13. 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), p. 12-13. 
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conducted overland or through the air, then the importance 
of sea power would diminish commensurately. 
the benefits of sea power accrue even without sea force. 
Sea force enhances the benefit of sea power only when 
protection of shipping is necessary. 
relationship when he stated: 
In the absence of a threat, trade continues and 
Mahan emphasizes this 
Seapower, in its military sense, is the offspring, not 
the parent, of commerce. The necessity of a navy springs 
from the existence of a peaceful shipping and disappears 
with it.33 
Undoubtedly true when Mahan did his writing, the 
relationship between national commerce and sea force has 
evolved since then. Rather than limiting naval activity to 
the protection of national shipping, the U.S. Navy has 
assumed general responsibility for guaranteeing freedom of 
navigation where ever it may be threatened. To the extent 
that U.S. national interests are at stake, the U.S. Navy 
acts to promote safe passage and free trade across the 
globe. 
and the reflagging/escort of Kuwaiti tankers through the 
Straits of Hormuz in 1989. 
extending this naval umbrella, the United States has 
developed new missions for its Navy beyond the protection of 
commerce. In support of ground forces and political 
objectives, power projection has emerged in this century as 
one of the primary functions of U.S. Naval forces. A 
discussion specific to the functions of naval forces crosses 
into the realm of naval power and is further developed 
below. 
Examples include Gulf of Sidra operations in 1986 
Besides reshaping the use of naval force by 
33Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History,  p. 26. 
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3 .  Naval Power 
a. Definition 
Naval power i s  the measure o f  a s ta t e ' s  ab i l i t y  
t o :  f i r s t ,  control passage upon the seas through the threat 
or use o f  force;  second, pro jec t  power ashore. I t s  
pr inc ip le  components are naval ships, submarines, a i r c r a f t ,  
and t h e i r  associated weapons systems, t o  include guns,  
missiles, embarked airwings, and amphibious forces .  I t  i s  
the naval component of sea force .  
b. Discussion 
This definition encompasses both the traditional 
and modern objectives of naval power. In the traditional 
definition, the object of naval power is to control passage 
on the sea. This implies a condition of disputed command. 
If command of the sea is secured or a surplus of naval 
assets permits, the object of naval power can focus 
elsewhere. When absolute command is secured, safe passage 
of allies is assured, and the object of naval power shifts 
to support objectives ashore. In this situation, the 
traditional definition is inadequate and must be adjusted to 
allow for alternate objectives for the use of naval power. 
For that reason, the second objective, power projection, is 
included in the definition of naval power above. 
two distinct objects of naval power are identified: control 
of passage and power projection. In distinguishing between 
these two objects, a now familiar theme re-emerges. The 
first object, control of passage, suggests an open-ocean, 
Mahanian-navalist perspective on the proper use of naval 
power. The second object, power projection, is more 
suggestive of Corbett's thinking in that it seeks useful 
employment for naval assets that are not preoccupied with 
controlling passage. Again, the significance of these two 
In the definition of naval power provided above, 
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men with respect to the U . S .  Navy's shift in emphasis from 
open-ocean operations to littoral area operations asserts 
itself. 
c. Objects of Naval Power 
The following paragraphs define the phrases 
"control of passage" and "power projection". 
controlling passage means that enemy transit of certain seas 
is denied while allies transit safely. A discussion of 
con t ro l  of passage starts with command of the sea .  
The object of naval warfare must always be directly 
or indirectly either to secure the command of the 
sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it.34 
(1) Control of Passage. Simply stated, 
. 
In this citation, Corbett identifies command 
of the sea as the object of naval warfare. It is in his 
definition of command of the sea that con t ro l  of passage 
emerges as the true object of naval warfare: 
Command of the sea means nothing but the control of 
maritime communications, commercial and military. 
The object of naval warfare is the control of 
communications, and not, as in land warfare, the 
conquest of territory. The difference is 
fundamental.. . S t a t e d  more c l e a r l y ,  t h a t  which 
command of the sea c o n t r o l s  i s  the r i g h t  of 
passage.  35 
From the citation above then, controlling 
passage means that the enemy is denied passage while allies 
pass safely. Control of the sea and passage however are 
rarely ensured completely, being most often contested. The 
following citation takes the issue of control and subdivides 
34Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime S t r a t e g y ,  p. 7 7 .  
35ibid., p. 80. 
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it into five categories that reflect varying degrees of 
control : 36 
1. Absolute control-command of the sea. In this 
situation, one side has complete freedom to operate 
without any interruption. The other side cannot 
operate at all. 
2. Working control. The dominant side can operate 
with a high degree of freedom and minimum risk. The 
enemy can operate only with a high degree of risk. 
3. Control in dispute. Each side operates with 
considerable risk and must establish working control 
for limited intervals to achieve specific objectives. 
Historically, this situation prevails more than the 
others. 
4. Enemy working control. This is the reverse of #2. 
5. Enemy absolute control. This is the reverse of #l. 
From the foregoing, several important items 
should be noted because they re-emerge in the discussion in 
subsequent chapters. First, absolute control has been a 
rare event in naval history. The luxury to operate freely 
while completely denying the enemy's ability to operate has 
not been frequently granted. Second, the most common 
situation is control in dispute. In this situation, 
temporary working control must be achieved to pursue 
specific military objectives. This situation was 
demonstrated hundreds of times in the Pacific during World 
War I1 as fierce naval battles for command of the sea were 
waged prior to the commitment of amphibious forces in island 
36B. Mitchell Simpson 111, The Development of Naval Thought: 
Essays by Herbert Rosinski (Newport: Naval War College Press, 
1977), p. xix. 
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Third, there are degrees of risk associated 
with each category. A bold or incompetent enemy may 
knowingly or unknowingly run these risks in the prosecution 
of a campaign. All three of these points reemerge in the 
consideration of the American Revolutionary War as command 
of the sea and degrees of control shift between 
belligerents. The manner in which control is exercised by 
each of the belligerents in that war is also salient. 
a basis for discussing a definition of power projection: 
( 2 )  Power Projection. Geoffrey Till provides 
. . .power projection in conventional warfare 
connotes the Navy's ability to launch sea-based air 
and around attacks against enemy taraets onshore. 
It also involves naval aun bombardment of enemy 
naval forces at port and installations. It is 
meant to enhance the efforts of U.S. and Allied 
land-based forces in achieving their 
The essential features of this definition are 
underlined and are four in number: first, air and ground 
attacks are sea-based; second, the targets are located 
onshore; third, naval gun bombardment is a form of power 
projection. The final point requires further discussion. 
because of developments that have shaded the definition 
since it was published in 1976 .  The fourth point contends 
that power projection is intended to enhance the efforts of 
U.S. and allied land-base forces in achieving their 
objectives. This requires that power projection be 
The fourth point is subject to debate largely 
37Samuel Eliot Morison, The Two-Ocean War: A Short  History 
of the Uni t ed  S t a t e s  Navy i n  the Second World War (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1 9 6 3 ) ,  pp. 275-555. 
198, citing Washington Planning U . S .  General Purpose Forces: The 
Navy. Congressional Budget Office, Dec. 1976, p. 1. 
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38Geoffrey Till, Maritime S t r a t e g y  and the Nuclear Age, p. 
conducted as part of a joint or combined operation. 
implies that naval power operating in isolation cannot 
project power. A case that argues against this requirement 
occurred recently in response to Iraqi violations of United 
Nations sanctions in the aftermath of the Gulf War. As 
ordered, the U.S. Navy retaliated by attacking targets in 
southern Iraq. There was no intent to enhance the efforts 
of land-based forces, yet it was a clear example of power 
projection by naval forces. The implied requirement that an 
operation has to enhance the effort of landAbased forces 
does not apply. Naval forces alone are capable of 
projecting power. 
or not there is a distinction between power projection and 
littoral warfare. This writer contends that there is a 
difference, and that difference centers on the question of 
whether or not the operation supports land-based forces. If 
it does, the operation is simultaneously power projection 
and littoral warfare. If not, the operation is simply power 
pro j ec t ion. 
Another operational consideration that helps 
distinguish between power projection and littoral warfare 
hinges on the difference between a target and an objective. 
A target need only be destroyed while an objective is 
generally seized and controlled. 
the full spectrum from destruction through control while 
littoral warfare places far heavier emphasis on control. A 
more detailed consideration of littoral warfare follows. 
It 
This fourth point raises the issue of whether 
Power projection covers 
4.  Littoral Warfare 
a .  One Perspective on L i t t o r a l  Warfare 
Littoral warfare exists along a continuum between 
the "pure" forms of warfare (navy vs. navy and army vs. 
army) that are its poles. The three forms taken together 
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form the warfare continuum. 
power, U.S. based military strength travels abroad to exer 
the political will of the United States in the target 
nation. First the sea, then the littoral area, and finally 
enemy territory must be controlled until the objective is 
realized or abandoned. Littoral warfare is just one part of 
this progression. It is the link that overlaps the "pure" 
forms and shares characteristics of both. Littoral warfare 
is the culmination of the naval war because its execution 
implies at least local command of the sea. 'Littoral warfare 
is also the enabler of the land campaign that leads to the 
desired effect. 
Through the projection of 
b. Definition3' 
Littoral warfare is a power projection operation 
intended to be of finite duration using expeditionary forces 
with the immediate aim of establishing battlespace dominance 
to enable broader, land-based objectives. 
c .  Discussion 
The following characteristics are considered 
essential elements of littoral warfare which collectively 
define it: 
1) power projection 
--seabased forces 
--targets located ashore 
2) forces are expeditionary and joint 
3) operation intended to be of finite duration 
4 )  immediate objective is battlespace dominance 
39This definition of littoral warfare emphasizes the U.S. 
offensive culture of aggressive, forward operations. The target 
nation responds to U.S. initiatives in a more defensive form of 
littoral warfare that is not specifically addressed in this 
definition. 
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5 )  battlespace dominance enables follow-on forces 
to pursue broader, longer-term, land-based 
objectives. 
Each of these elements of littoral warfare is 
discussed below in more detail. 
(1) Power Projection. Little more needs to 
be added about power projection except to emphasize that it 
involves the use of the sea to launch an attack against the 
landmass. 
territory, and is offensive, forceful, and aggressive by 
nature. These attributes are more pronounced in littoral 
warfare because it specifically involves invasion and seeks 
to achieve more durable objectives than target destruction 
alone. 
The requirement that the target be land-based 
is useful in distinguishing between warfare in the littoral 
and littoral warfare. An example of warfare in the littoral 
that is not littoral warfare is Admiral Horatio Nelson's 
confron-tation with the French at the Battle of the Nile. 
For a number of reasons, the French commander, Vice Admiral 
Francois Brueys, decided to anchor and fight the British 
from a stationary position. Brueys selected a site under 
cover of shore batteries with shoals guarding his flank. He 
had calculated that the British would be reluctant to risk 
either the shoals or a withering fire from the fort. Brueys 
miscalculated on both accounts with devastating consequences 
for his fleet.40 
The outcome of the battle however, is not the 
issue. The objective of both belligerents was destruction 
of the enemy's fleet. The battle occurred in the littoral 
Power projection necessarily violates sovereign 
40Wayne P. Hughes Jr., Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986), p. 16-24. 
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. 
but without an objective ashore, the event cannot properly 
be called littoral warfare. 
(2) Joint and Expeditionary. Purely naval 
forces, such as AEGIS cruisers and LOS ANGELES class 
submarines, are optimized for open-ocean warfare. While it 
is true these units possess a capability to strike the land, 
the platform as a whole is best utilized in blue water 
(provided, of course, that the enemy is there as well). 
Similarly, purely land forces are optimized for continental 
campaigns. The nexus for these "pure" forces is in-the 
littoral. Littoral warfare requires a blend of capabili- 
ties, equipment, training, doctrine, etc., drawn from the 
strengths of both land and sea forces. This creates a 
natural tendency for littoral operations to be strongly' 
joint in character. 
The expeditionary nature of littoral forces 
is similarly based on natural requirements. Movement from 
ship to shore requires a degree of mobility not found in the 
heavier units optimized for sustained land campaigns. 
Expeditionary forces are designed with an emphasis on 
mobility and surprise to facilitate local concentration. 
The objective is seized, consolidated, and turned-over to 
other forces. Expeditionary forces do not have the logistic 
infrastructure to support long-term occupation and control 
of territory. Their assault skills are sub-optimized in 
this role also. 
( 3 )  Operations of Finite Duration. Littoral 
warfare involves the use of sea-based forces against land- 
based objectives. This situation has great potential for 
force asymmetries between expeditionary forces and 
continental defenders, especially if the enemy is powerful 
or determined. The advantage to the defenders is eliminated 
when the attacker establishes continental forces of his own 
3 4  
on the land. 
operation is to minimize the amount of time that 
expeditionary forces must fight against the more heavily 
equipped forces ashore. For this reason, littoral warfare 
is intended to be of finite duration. Littoral warfare 
ceases when heavier forces are established on the landmass 
and the conflict takes on a continental character. Littoral 
warfare is a transition period in which sea-based ground 
forces seek to enable other forces, larger and better- 
tailored to the task, to enforce the political will; 
(4) Battlespace Dominance. Battlespace 
dominance brings two advantages in littoral warfare: first, 
it protects the expeditionary cadre and facilitates their 
efforts; second, it provides safe haven for ship-to-shore 
movement of heavier forces during the period in which they 
are most vulnerable. 
dominance'' derives from older concepts. It has historical 
roots in such phrases as: mastery of the sea; command of the 
sea; and sea control. Battlespace dominance is simply a 
multi-dimen-sional version of these terms. It moves the 
concept of control beyond water surfaces to include the 
ocean depths as well as the airspace over littoral areas, 
both land and sea. The following citations reveal the 
similarities between the concepts of sea control and 
battlespace dominance: 
One of the objectives of the littoral 
The meaning of the term "battlespace 
Battlespace dominance is the heart of naval 
warfare. 41 
4 1 . .  .From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service f o r  the 21st 
Century, p. 6 .  
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The object of naval warfare must always be directly 
or indirectly either to secure the command of the 
sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it.42 
Communications dominate war. The power to insure 
these communications to one's self and to interrupt 
them for an adversary, affects the very root of a 
nation's vigor. This is the prerogative of the sea 
power. 4 3  
The similarities between the words of Corbett 
and Mahan and those taken from . . .  From the Sea are striking: 
control or dominance remain the centerpiece Df naval. 
warfare. The only variation appears in the expanded 
dimensions of the problem due to the invention of the 
aircraft and the submarine. 
characteristic of littoral warfare is an extension of issues 
previously discussed. 
itself. Instead, it enables broader objectives by providing 
protection for heavier forces as they are landed and 
organized for a continental campaign. It is the follow-on 
forces that will pursue the broader, land-based objectives 
whose attainment enforces the attacker's political will, 
which is the true objective of all warfare. 
(5) Enables Land-based Objectives. This 
Littoral warfare is not an end in 
5 .  Bummary 
This chapter has introduced the terms and concepts that 
are used in later chapters to discuss the interaction of 
land and sea power. 
Revolutionary War, both belligerents were maritime powers in 
With respect to the American 
42Corbett, Some Principles of M i r i t i m e  S t r a t e g y ,  p. 7 7 .  
43A11an Westcott, ed., Mahan on Naval War fare :  Selections 
From the Writings of Rear Admiral A l f r e d  T .  Mahan (Boston: 
Little, Brown, and Co., 1918), pp. 77-78. 
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that they each had goods to trade, ships to carry those 
goods, partners willing to trade, and the shore-based 
institutions to organize and finance the trade. 
In the realm of sea power however, inequalities between 
the belligerents were apparent. Whereas Great Britain had a 
symmetric development in both components of sea power 
(commerce and sea force), the Colonies had an asymmetric 
development with virtually no sea force when hostilities 
were joined in 1775. Without the capability to protect its 
commerce, Colonial sea-lines of communication were immedi- 
ately vulnerable to attack by British men-of-war. In 
addition, all points in North America accessible from the 
sea or inland waterways were potential targets for power 
projection and assault by joint British forces. 
The Colonies were able to dilute British naval 
superiority to some extent by commissioning privateers, but 
it was not until the arrival of French naval power that any 
real possibility existed for war resolution on terms 
favorable to the Colonists. 
concepts defined in this chapter. 
discussion about the interaction of land and sea forces in 
the American Revolutionary War relies on them in a similar 
fashion. 
This overview demonstrates the use of the terms and 
Subsequent narrative and 
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111. HISTORICAL NARRATIVE 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this chapter is to narrate segments of 
the American Revolutionary War in which naval developments 
influenced the conduct of the military campaign ashore. 
These segments will then be used as a basis for discussion 
about optimizing the uses of naval power in the littoral in 
support of ground forces. 
B. OVERVIEW 
The discussion in this chapter begins with a descrip- 
tion of strategic conditions that faced each of the 
belligerents just prior to the start of hostilities in 1775. 
The discussion proceeds to an explanation of how these 
conditions shaped the initial war plans of each side. 
understanding of each belligerent's initial war objectives 
provides a good basis for critical review of the manner in 
which each side subsequently used naval power to influence 
the land campaign. 
in segments. No attempt is made at a comprehensive review 
of all its aspects; the emphasis throughout is on the 
interaction between land and sea forces, and the segments 
were selected accordingly. The war segments selected for 
review are the events surrounding these battles: the Lake 
Champlain waterway; Boston; New York; Philadelphia; and 
Yorktown. Each is considered below. 
An 
Once hostilities are joined, the War is considered 
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C. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT IN 1775 
1. The Unequal Naval Struggle 
The Revolutionary War pitted the world's dominant naval 
power against a fledgling nation lacking any naval forces 
when the conflict started. However, the Colonies had 
established a strong maritime tradition by building a large 
merchant fleet that was active around the world. 
Without a navy to protect them, Colonial supply lines 
and unarmed merchants were vulnerable to Britain's naval 
strength. 
Navy to establish a blockade of Colonial ports. 
of goods from Colonial shipping could be cut-off entirely, 
the Revolutionaries' prosecution of the land campaign would 
be nearly impossible. Nevertheless, despite an undisputed 
command of the sea early in the War, Britain did not employ 
her naval forces in this potentially war-winning strategy. 
Reasons for this failure are numerous and are discussed 
further below. For now, it is enough to note the 
distinctions between naval superiority, command of the sea, 
and effective exercise of that command. Great Britain 
possessed the first two items but negated their value 
through a faulty exercise of the third. 
2. Geography as the Equalizer 
Although there was a unit mismatch between the naval 
This fact was an open invitation'for the-Royal 
If the flow 
forces of the two belligerents, this discrepancy was 
partially equalized by natural geographic conditions, which 
equated to a form of naval strength for the colonies. 
conditions included: extent of territory, distance, and 
interior communications. 
These 
a. Extent of Territory 
The size of colonial America, both landmass and 
coastline, was quite large by European standards and presen- 
40 
ted a difficult challenge to British planners in spite of 
undisputed command of the sea. With respect to blockade, 
the number of vessels required is in direct proportion to 
the number of communications to be controlled. A n  extensive 
coastline with many natural harbors, such as the eastern 
seaboard of North America, required a correspondingly large 
investment in fleet assets for a blockade to be effective. 
British naval superiority notwithstanding, the colonists 
were able, in some cases, to use the sea in support of their 
war objectives. This situation was to repeat itself later 
in the 18th century when the French were able to use coastal 
seas despite blockade by the British'. 
Extent of territory however, was a double-edged 
sword that also worked against the Continental Army. One of 
the advantages that is produced by command of the sea is 
mobility of armies. Whereas the British were faced with the 
task of interdicting sea lines of communication along a 
great length of coastline, the colonists were faced with the 
challenge of defending that same coastline against invasion. 
Because armies marching overland in North America could 
never match the seaborne mobility of the British, defense of 
the coast was largely left to local forces. The results 
were predictable. 
major colonial cities at times and places of their choice, 
usually with success. In addition, British supply by sea 
was a relatively simple matter and armies could normally be 
withdrawn as qu.ickly as they could be inserted. Command of 
the sea was a significant advantage for army commanders 
throughout the war. 
British armies moved by sea and attacked 
'Jan S. Breemer, The Burden of T r a f a l g a r :  Decisive B a t t l e  
and Naval S t r a t e g i c  Expectations on the Eve of the F i r s t  World 
War (Newport: Naval War College, 1993), p. 21. 
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b. Distance 
Distance, in this case, refers to long lines of 
communication the British had to traverse in order to 
support their war effort. As distance increases, so does 
the number of ships required to supply the war effort. The 
protection of these transport ships from American privateers 
placed further demands on naval forces already overextended 
along the seaboard. The result was that fewer ships were 
available to exercise effective command of the sea. 
c. Interior Communications 
Rivers, bays, and lakes were of paramount 
importance as lines of communications because the North 
American continent was bereft of paved roads at the time of 
the Revolution.2 The British fleet restricted the use of 
the waters along the Atlantic seaboard, and off-coast 
movement occurred only at great risk to the colonists. 
Turning inland, the few roads that existed were barely 
passable even under the best of weather conditions. 
value of controlling the extensive network of inland 
waterways was quickly recognized by both belligerents, and 
the early years of the Revolutionary War are a chronicle of 
the efforts by both sides to win that control. 
The 
3. Defending the m i r e  
Already burdened by the requirements of prosecu- 
ting a war in North America, Britain's Navy was simulta- 
neously tasked to defend the interests of the Empire around 
the world. The small skirmish that started in the Colonies 
eventually attained the character of a world war with 
Britain standing alone against the combined forces of many 
of the great powers of Europe. This acted to further 
'E.B. Potter, ed., Sea Power: A Naval History (Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press, 1981), p. 92. 
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diminish the naval power available to Britain to effectively 
exercise command of the sea and defeat the rebellious 
colonies. 
4. Popular Loyalties 
Both belligerents believed that the loyalty of the 
inhabitants could/should be exploited in support of war- 
winning strategies. 
Massachusetts Colony to be the center of rebellion with the 
other colonies, especially those in the South, remaining 
predominantly loyal to the crown. For their part, the 
colonists believed that the population of Canada wanted only 
a spark to erupt in rebellion and join the revolution 
spreading from its more southerly neighbor. Both bellige- 
rents were incorrect in assessing the loyalties of the 
respective populations, and both miscalculations figured 
prominently in the opening moves of each side during the 
war. The false promise of loyalists in the south also 
figured prominently later in the war when Britain drained 
sorely-needed troops from New York to campaign from 
Charleston northward. 
Great Britain perceived the 
5. Strategic Objectives of the Belligerents 
Washington's ultimate war objective was to remove the 
British armies from the colonies; no other military outcome 
was consistent with the political goal of independence. 
Given the relative strength of the Continental Army and the 
ultimate objective, Washington relied upon the possibility 
that a protracted struggle would result in ever-increasing 
political opposition in London that would force London's 
abandonment of the ~onflict.~ 
3 R ~ ~ ~ e l  F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of 
United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1973), p. 5 .  
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Not surprisingly, 
cally opposed. They w 
the British war aims were diametri- 
nted a quick, decisive engagement 
that would eliminate the Continental Army as a military 
force, thereby bringing the conflict to an end. 
D. THE LAKE CKAMPLAIN WATERWAY 
1. Wartime Significance 
The significance of Lake Champlain and its connec- 
ting waterways is well-expressed in the following: 
In the days when the frontier severing-Canada from 
New England and New York was a wilderness, the only 
easy avenue of communication was by way of Lake 
Champlain and the Richelieu River. With the 
exception of a few miles of rapids in the river, 
the whole distance from the St. Lawrence to the 
head of Lake Champlain was navigable, and as the 
shores were rough and densely wooded, the only 
practicable route was by water. This natural 
gateway was therefore of great military importance, 
and a struggle for its possession has marked every 
war involving Canada and the colonies or states to 
the south. 'I4 
When it became clear that open hostilities were un- 
avoidable, the Lake Champlain waterway (LCW) quickly became 
the focus of military attention. For the colonists, control 
of the LCW had two advantages, both of which fueled the 
fires of political opposition in London. Through the LCW, 
the rebellion could be spread to Canada. Involving Canada 
not only enlarged the political and military dimensions of 
the problem, but it also facilitated mobility and logisitics 
for the Continental Army. 
consideration for the Continental Army, because the loss of 
Avoiding a decisive engagement was a critical 
4Gardner W. Allen, A Naval H i s t o r y  of the American 
Revolu t ion  (New York: Russell & Russell, 1962), p. 161. 
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that Army would end the war5. Mobility is the key to 
avoidance and successful maneuver warfare. With the 
Atlantic seaboard already commanded by the British navy, the 
inland waterways became the key to mobility in colonial 
America. 
essential and their control by Colonial forces was important 
to revolutionary effort. 
British control of the LCW had other implications for 
the Colonists. 
could separate the rebellious colonies of New England from 
the more stable southern colonies, and then provide an 
attack route to New York City from the interior.6 The 
mobility advantage would go to the already superior British 
armies, and would result in their control of the resource- 
rich Hudson Valley, thereby outflanking the Continental Army 
in New York City. 
Denying these waterways to the British was 
It would facilitate a military campaign that 
2. Campaign Overview 
The struggle for control of Lake Champlain was the 
campaign focus for both belligerents for the first two years 
of the Revolutionary War. 
ashore and on the waterways, and remains an excellent 
example of littoral warfare at the tactical level. Soldiers 
and sailors moved smoothly from ship to shore and back, 
performing duties as required by the situation. Ironically, 
although the colonists eventually prevailed in the area 
battle, it was the British who won and maintained control of 
Lake Champlain.. British ships controlled communications on 
Lake Champlain until 1781, but were unable to extend that 
control into the surrounding wilderness. 
This battle raged simultaneously 
'Russel Weigley, The American Way of War, p. 12. 
6A.T. Mahan, Major Operations of the Navies i n  the War of 
American Independence, pp. 7-8. 
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3. Hostilities Commence 
The British held the LCW with token forces in early 
1775. After the exchanges at Lexington and Concord in April 
1775, and before the British could respond officially from 
London, the colonists under the command of Ethan Allen 
seized an outpost at Fort Ticonderoga. This fort was 
located on Lake Champlain and was the key to controlling 
communications along the waterway.7 
strategy at the start of the War was to overtax the-British 
forces by spreading the rebellion into Canada. To that end, 
Benedict Arnold and Brigadier General Richard Montgomery 
took Montreal and besieged Quebec until the spring of 1776.  
At that time, British reinforcements were able to break 
through the ice on the St. Lawrence Seaway and relieve 
Quebec. * 
ority arriving from the sea, Arnold led his small band down 
the Richelieu River and into Lake Champlain. 
the military significance of the Lake, Arnold set 
immediately about defending its control which had been 
established by colonial forces in 1775. Arnold's soldiers 
soon found themselves engaged in the construction of naval 
vessels to maintain control of the Lake. Arnold himself, 
who had some nautical experience, was put in command in 
August 1776.9 
As mentioned, one of the objectives of colonial 
In the face of overwhelming British numerical superi- 
Recognizing 
7ibid., p. 33. 
'E.B. Potter, Sea Power: A Naval History, p. 3 4 .  
'Gardner Allen, A Naval History of the American Revolution, 
p. 1 6 3 .  
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Arnold and his soldiers worked feverishly to build a 
margin of naval superiority that would go unchallenged by 
the British. Appreciative of the advantages that control of 
the Lake provided however, the British were equal to the 
challenge. Utilizing the carpenters and mechanics of the 
Royal Navy, and to some extent, the shipbuilding facilities 
of Quebec, the British pursued the lone solution to their 
dilemma. lo 
4. Tactical Defeat Yields Strategic Victory 
The Americans lost this shipbuilding contest on Lake 
Champlain and after several gallant battles, they also lost 
control of the Lake. A tactical naval defeat for the 
colonists, it was nonetheless a strategic military victory. 
Though the Continental flotilla was defeated and then 
destroyed by the British, it had served its objective well: 
By the time the British had taken Crown Point the 
season was far advanced. This fact and the 
presence of a formidable American force (army) 
deterred them from at once attempting the capture 
of Ticonderoga. They withdrew to Canada for the 
winter, and their purpose of occupying the valley 
of the Hudson and separating New England from the 
other states was put off. They returned the next 
year . . .  but the opportunity had passed.ll 
The naval action in Lake Champlain delayed for three 
months the British advance toward the Hudson River. These 
three months caused a further delay due to the onset of 
winter. The delay permitted the Continental Army to 
regroup, resupply, and organize a military defense against 
the inevitable renewal of the British offensive in the 
"Dudley W. Knox, The Naval Genius of George Washington 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1932), p. 26.  
"Gardner Allen, A Naval History of the American Revolution, 
pp. 178-79. 
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spring of 1777. 
forces in delaying the British and allowing for the 
preparation of a proper defense demonstrate a remarkable 
achievement in the execution of joint littoral warfare by 
the colonists. 
the command of General Burgoyne the next spring. 
heavily resisted campaign, the British pushed to within 
thirty miles of Albany, where General Howe's army had been 
expected to rendezvous after moving from New York, up the 
Hudson Valley, to the vicinity of A1bany.l' Howe had 
abandoned that plan and moved his army to Philadelphia and 
Burgoyne was fought to a stand-still by the reinforced army 
which the Americans had collected. 
retreat, and desperately short of supplies, Burgoyne's Army 
laid down arms and surrendered at Saratoga on October 17, 
1777. l3 
the naval action on Lake Champlain the previous year. 
feat was far more valuable than the thwarting of a single 
British military campaign. 
Burgoyne's surrender was an indication of the will and 
capability of the colonies to defeat the combined strength 
of Britain's army and navy. Even more important, the 
victory at Saratoga gave Britain's traditional enemy, 
France, the impetus to openly ally itself with the 
Colonists. 
the gross imbalance in naval power between the two 
belligerents. 
The cooperation between land and sea (lake) 
As expected, the British pushed south from Canada under 
In a 
Unable to advance or 
The military victory at Saratoga was made possible by 
This 
At the strategic level, 
The. French Navy entered the fray and corrected 
With the outbreak of war between France and 
12A.T. Mahan, Major Operations of the Navies i n  the War of 
American Independence, p. 2 8 .  
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Britain in 1778,  the scene of maritime interest in the 
Revolutionary War shifted to salt water, and there it 
remained until the dramatic conclusion at Yorktown.14 
16E.B. Potter, ed., Sea Power: A Naval History, p. 3 3 .  
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E. THE BATTLE FOR BOSTON 
The spreading spirit of revolt in the thirteen 
colonies had been encouraged by the sight of the 
British army cooped up in the town, suffering from 
want of necessaries, while the colonial army 
blockading it was able to maintain its position, 
because ships laden with stores for the one were 
captured, and the cargoes diverted to- the use of 
the 0ther.l' 
1. Overview 
This citation provides a quick overview of the situ- 
ation faced by the belligerents in Boston in 1776.  Boston 
had been recognized as a center for rebellion since 1773 
when, in reaction to the Coercive Acts, the Boston Tea Party 
occurred. Among other "indignities", the Coercive Acts 
closed the port of Boston and abolished certain liberties 
long enjoyed in Massachusetts, such as selecting their own 
Councils. Attempts by the British to enforce the Coercive 
Acts led to the shootings at Lexington and Concord in 1775  
which galvanized many of the colonists against the British. 
The small British garrison in Boston soon found itself 
surrounded by 16,000 American militia, and the situation of 
the British defenders was perilous until the arrival by sea 
of Major General Sir William Howe with 10,000 troops.16 
and Colonial armies were soon stalemated in the Boston area 
Although there were numerous skirmishes, the British 
14ibid. 
15ibid., p. 30 .  
due the disposition of forces and relative strengths. With 
little production capacity or means of efficient transport, 
the colonists were woefully short of the necessary powder 
and shot to continue prosecuting a stalemated war. 
first report to Congress after taking over the command of 
the Continental Army at Boston in July 1775, Washington 
noted: 
We are so exceedingly destitute that our artillery 
will be of little use, without a supply both large 
and seasonable. What we have must be reserved for 
the small arms, and that managed with the utmost 
frugality . I7 
In his 
2. Breaking the Stalemate 
The British forces in Boston lacked for nothing because 
ships arrived regularly, bringing munitions, provisions, and 
whatever else was needed. Washington's solution to his 
dilemma took account of both his lack of supply and the 
British abundance of seaborne supply. 
recognition of the solution anticipates Mahan by more than a 
century: 
To secure free and ample communications for one's self, 
and to interrupt those of the opponent, are among the 
first requirements of war.18 
Washington's 
Furthermore, Washington's insight epitomizes the appli- 
cation of naval power as a solution to a military problem. 
Its simplicity cloaks its genius. Washington decided to 
divert British shipping to fill the needs of the Continental 
army. l9 
17Dudley Knox, The Naval Genius of George Washington, p .  7 .  
18A.T. Mahan, The Major Operations of the Navies i n  the War 
of American Independence, p. 3 0 .  
lgibid., p. 35. 
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Finding the Ministerial troops in Boston resolved 
to keep themselves close within their lines, and 
that it was judged impracticable to get at them, he 
began as early as September 2nd to fit out armed 
vessels with the design to pick up some of their 
storeships and transports.'' 
The schooner Hannah was the first vessel commissioned 
The most important capture was made by 
by Washington. She sailed on 5 September, returning in two 
days with a prize. 
Captain Manley commanding the Lee". The British brigantine 
Nancy had failed to arrive in Boston with her convoy and 
armed with that intelligence, Manley set out to locate the 
Nancy. When found, she surrendered without resistance.22 
Her cargo included 2000 muskets, thirty tons of 
musket shot, thirty thousand round shot, one 
hundred thousand flints, several barrels of powder, 
eleven mortar beds, and a thirteen-inch brass 
mortar. It was estimated that eighteen months 
would have been required for the Americans to 
manufacture such a quantity of ordnance as was 
brought in on Nancy.23 
By November, six armed vessels were operating in 
Washington's Navy, serving the double purpose of reducing 
the supplies to the besieged British in Boston and 
replenishing the poverty-stricken American Army. 
short existence, Washington's navy took 3 8  prizes24. Of 
particular interest in this consideration of joint warfare, 
In its 
20Dudley Knox, The Naval Genius of George Washington, p .  8 .  
21John R. Spears, The History of Our Navy From I t s  Or ig in  t o  
the Present Day: 1775-1897 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1897) , 196. 
22Dudley Knox, The Naval Genius of George Washington, p .  8 .  
23ibid., p.  11. 
24E.B. Potter, ed., Sea Power: A Naval History, p. 3 5 .  
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the original crews had been taken from the soldiers of the 
Army, which had been recruited wholly from the seafaring 
population of Massachusetts.25 
thorouahlv just i f ied bv the necessities confrontinu his  armv 
and bv the results achieved i n  uivina indiswensable 
assistance t o  his owerations on shore.26 
3. The British Abandon Boston 
The ease with the British Army withdrew from Boston 
provides another lesson in littoral warfare; The - 
circumstances leading to that withdrawal include movement of 
cannon from Fort Ticonderoga. The cannon were placed in the 
Dorchester Heights overlooking the British position in 
Boston. This gave the Continental Army a military advantage 
and forced the British to choose between evacuation and 
bombardment. General Howe opted for the former and moved 
his army by sea to Halifax to await reinforcements and 
further orders. The withdrawal was unopposed and Washington 
was again reminded that a s  lona a s  the B r i t i s h  had free use 
of the sea, the Americans were helwless t o  wrevent either 
the evacuation o f  a beaten armv or seaborne foravs alona the 
coast. 27 
The creation of a naval force bv this Armv General was 
F. THE BATTLE FOR NEW YORK 
1. Wartime Significance 
New York was critically situated because of its 
location at the. ocean terminus of the Hudson River. The 
Hudson provided water communication with the important 
25Dudley Knox, The Naval Genius of George Washington, p. 10. 
26ibid., p. 11. 
27E.B. Potter, Sea Power: A Naval History, p. 3 5 .  
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region of upstate New York from which large supplies of 
provisions for the Continental army had to be drawn. In 
addition, the Hudson Valley separated the northern and 
southern colonies, and provided communications with Canada. 
Centrally located on the Eastern sea-board, New York served 
as an excellent point of dispatch for troops and supplies to 
any point along the coast. With a good natural harbor, it 
was directly accessible from the ocean, and its port 
facilities were the best in North America. 
The British had other reasons for securing New-York. 
In a letter to the Admiralty, Admiral Howe said that: 
Until His Majesty's troops can repossess some ports 
upon the coast of America, great difficulties will 
attend the execution of their orders; and that it 
will be impracticable in most parts of the winter 
season. 
Having evacuated Boston the previous season, the 
British necessarily looked toward New York as the linchpin 
of their campaign. Each for their own reasons, both 
belligerents desired to control this port.28 
2.  Use of the Enemy's Commanded Sea 
In anticipation of British designs on New York, 
Washington dispatched six regiments there as soon as the 
evacuation of Boston had commenced. The whole of the 
Continental army was to follow in a few days. 
The British, exercising command of the sea, were free 
to complete the journey from Boston to New York by sea. 
Alternately, using conventional logic with respect to the 
rules of war, the Americans should have marched the entire 
distance to New York and avoided risking the army at sea. 
They did not, opting instead to sail from New London to New 
York. 
~ 
28Dudley Knox, The Naval  Genius of George Washington, p. 1 5 .  
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This maritime expedient, believed to be necessary 
for the sake of dispatch, was really very 
precarious in view of possible interference from 
British men-of-war. The course of the small 
American transports was fortunately close to a 
shore line indented with numerous harbors, where 
refuge could be taken and the troops landed in an 
emergency. 29  
Despite the risk, Washington's troops arrived in New 
York ahead of the British, and set about preparing its 
defenses. This episode, taken together with the one already 
mentioned, points to the difficulty of exercising command of 
the sea by even a vastly superior fleet. 
Continental naval force was permitted use of the sea for 
A fledgling 
militarily significant troop movements, and continued to 
prey on crucial British supply ships bound for Boston. 
these instances, B r i t i s h  exercise o f  command o f  the sea 
fai led t o  the detriment o f  their overall war e f f o r t .  
In 
Reasons for the British inability to effectively 
command the sea are provided by Rear Admiral W.M. James of 
the Royal Navy: 
In recognition of the fact that . . .  "No government, 
unless in dire straits, will risk troops afloat on 
an uncommanded sea without adequate protection. 
The Admiralty were called on to guarantee the 
safety of the British transports during their 
movements and the resultant drain on their 
resources was the direct outcome to the weakness of 
the North American fleet in the earlier years." 30 
There can be little doubt that an encounter between 
belligerent naval fleets in the early years of the War would 
have gone badly for the Colonists. Without directly chal- 
29ibid., p. 16. 
30W.M. James, Rear-Admiral, R.N., The B r i t i s h  N a v y  i n  
Adversity: A Study of the War o f  American Independence (London: 
Longmans, Green and Co.,  1933), p. 38. 
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lenging British naval supremacy however, the colonists were 
able to dilute that naval superiority by forcing it to be 
spread out over a broad area. 
The Colonial navy forced the Admiralty to employ a 
large number of ships of the line on escorting 
duty, and the power of a well-handled mosquito 
fleet was never more clearly shown.31 
The small number of privateers commissioned by 
Washington had implications out of all proportion to their 
cost. The sealines of communication from Britain to North 
America were vulnerable along their entire length. 
tion of valuable shipping forced British men-of-war to be 
diverted from other duties. With British combatants 
preoccupied, the colonists were able to use the sea to 
support the land campaign. Transport and resupply of the 
Continental Army occurred on a sea ostensibly commanded by 
the British. 
Corbett between warfare on land and at sea. Control of 
territory is the objective of land war, while control of 
communications is the objective of sea warfare. If naval 
assets are not continuously applied to controlling passage 
on the sea, then passage on the sea is not controlled. By 
forcinu the escort o f  transoceanic transworts, American 
privateers loosened the B r i t i s h  blockade of the Eastern 
seaboard and uained some freedom t o  move the ir  armies i n  
l i t t o r a l  waters. It must be noted that the movement of the 
Continental Army from New London to New York by sea was done 
at great risk. 
Protec- 
This case makes clear the distinction made by 
3. With Mobility Comes Initiative 
Having safely transported his troops by sea from New 
London to New York, the dilemmas faced by Washington in 
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light of British naval superiority were by no means over- 
come. The Continental Army was still vulnerable at two 
points: New York itself and further up the Hudson. A 
balance had to be struck between the number of troops in New 
York and the number needed up the Hudson River to reinforce 
the units protecting Lake Champlain. With the advantage of 
mobility by sea, the British could concentrate their  forces 
against the colonists in either location. Washington lacked 
both the troop strength to divide his force, and the 
mobility to defend against both contingencies 
simultaneously. 
It was a clear case of slow-moving armies on land 
being unable to match the mobility afforded by 
ships whose destination could only be guessed.tt32 
T h i s  dilemma hiuhlicrhts the issue of ' i n i t i a t i v e  I ,*i 
war and demonstrates convincinulv whv i t  belonus t o  the 
belliuerent t h a t  commands the sea. Not only was Washington 
faced with the possibility that the British army could be 
landed in New York or further up the Hudson Valley, but it 
was equally likely that it could be landed in Philadelphia 
or any other population center that was accessible from the 
sea. In addition, the British stepped up their efforts to 
deny vital American shipping and commenced harassing 
bombardment of coastal towns as well. The Americans were 
cast in the unenviable position of responding to British 
initiatives made possible by seaborne mobility. 
4. The British Attack New York 
Only when Admiral Howe received reinforcements and 
considered them adequate to the task, did he commence his 
attack on New York. 
fireships, attempts to block, and attacks by shore 
Despite heavy opposition in the form of 
32ibid. p.22. 
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artillery, the Hudson was boldly reconnoitered for 3 5  days 
to select the point of assault33. On 22 August 1776, the 
British landed 15,000 men and 40 guns under the covering 
fire from frigates and bomb vessels. By the 27th, that army 
had increased to 25,000 troops, and Washington's army was in 
grave danger. The Americans now stood with their backs to a 
swift tidal stream, nearly a mile wide, with only a feeble 
line of works between them and an enemy more than double 
their number34. It was then that the British permitted 
their opponents to escape, thereby losing an opportunity to 
strike a blow that may have ended the American Revolution. 
When an enemy is greatly outnumbered, his line of retreat 
should be watched. With the British exercising local 
command of the sea as they were, the failure of the navy to 
seal the army's imminent victory is an example of a 
breakdown in joint warfare. 
10,000 man army and retreated into New Jersey.35 
base of joint operations for years to come. 
and harbor facilities were of inestimable value in 
prosecuting the war f o r  Britain. The b a t t l e  f o r  New York 
however i s  an examwle o f  missed owwortunitv f o r  the B r i t i s h  
who wermitted the trawwed Continental Armv t o  escawe. The 
most notable characteristic o f  this  missed owwortunitv was 
the fa i lu re  t o  coordinate land and sea forces i n  an e f f e c -  
t i v e  joint  e f f o r t .  
Washington escaped with his 
New York fell to the British, who used it as a central 
Its location 
~~~ ~ 
33ibid., p. 46. 
34A.T. Mahan, Major Operations o f  Navies i n  the War o f  
35ibid., p. 44. 
American Independence, p. 4 3 .  
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G. THE BATTLE FOR PHILADELPHIA 
1. Overview 
The actions of the British during the Philadelphia 
campaign provide two lessons for joint war are. 
lesson involves the manner in which Britain occupied that 
city, and the second involves the manner in which they left 
it. The British had already demonstrated the benefits of 
seaborne mobility in the relief of Quebec and the evacuation 
of Boston. The lesson in mobility was reemphasized in the 
campaign to take Philadelphia. 
the British enjoyed command of the sea. This was to change 
while the British were in Philadelphia. 
The first 
During that-campaign too, 
The 
demonstrates the impact of a shift in naval conditions on 
the movement of armies. While the British held 
Philadelphia, French naval power came to the aid of the 
Americans with a telling affect on the conduct of the land 
war. 
British Army's departure from Philadelphia 
2. Command of the Sea Equals Options for Armies 
After Washington and his colonial army had been forced 
to retreat from New York, they moved across New Jersey and 
on to Philadelphia. General Howe's forces gave chase, but 
the attempt was only half-hearted, so that the British were 
still in New Jersey when the lateness of the season caused 
the main British army to return to New York to winter. 
Lightly manned outposts were left behind in Trenton and 
Princeton. 
prospects for victory never seemed dimmer. Both New York 
and Lake Champlain had been lost during the campaigns of 
1776, and enthusiasm was fading. Washington's army had 
dwindled to 3,000 men, and a galvanizing victory was sorely 
needed to keep the spirit of the Revolution alive. 
This was a low-point for the Continental Army, and the 
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It was at this point that Washington make his dramatic 
Christmas night crossing of the Delaware River to surprise 
the Hessian garrison and occupy Trenton.36 A series of 
attacks on other outposts followed, and control of the 
greater part of New Jersey was established by the 
Continental army. Washington completed this winter campaign 
by taking a position in the highlands in Morristown which 
was difficult to assail and had the further advantage of 
offering flanking lines of approach to both the Hudson 
Valley and Philadel~hia.~~ 
enthusiasm for the Revolution, so that the ranks of 
Washington's army began to grow again. This growing force 
in Morristown threatened to check British movements and 
This campaign provided renewed 
stalemate the conflict. 
throughout the Revolutionary War. Assaulting entrenched 
forces on high ground was the least preferred method for 
General Howe to dislodge Washington's army from Morristown. 
As to bypassing the Continental army and marching to 
Philadelphia, "A tentative advance into New Jersey, and the 
consequent maneuvers of Washington, satisfied him that the 
enterprise by this route was too hazardous.'I3* 
The lessons of Bunker Hill remained with the British 
Howe concluded that he could best serve the British 
cause by destroying Washington's army, and that the 
surest way to draw Washington out of his highland 
fastness was to seize Philadelphia. To avoid 
another Trenton, Howe eschewed the overland 
approach and embarked his troops in transports.39 
36E.B. Potter, Sea Power: A Naval History, p. 35. 
37ibid. 
38A.T. Mahan, Major Operations of the Navies of the War of 
American Independence, p. 5 2 .  
39E.B. Potter, ed., Sea Power: A Naval History, p. 36. 
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I It was possible however, for General Howe to entirely 
avoid both unattractive alternatives. 
third option. Howe was able to exploit Britain's command of 
the sea to by embarking his troops on transports and sailing 
to Philadelphia. 
investment of Morristown, Howe turned the tables and was 
able to effectively choose the time and place of battle by 
moving by sea and hazarding an important objective. 
Mobili tv  throucrh ioint owerations wrovided General Howe w i t h  
the in i t ia t ive  t o  determine the time and wlace of batt le .  
The initiative enjoyed by General Howe was painfully 
absent on the Colonial side. It was by no means clear that 
the British were bound for Philadelphia. Coincident to this 
operation, General Burgoyne had renewed the British expe- 
dition down Lake Champlain toward the head waters of the 
Hudson River Valley. From the point of view of the 
colonists, that waterway was of equal or greater strategic 
value than Philadelphia. Washington suspected that General 
Howe's movement from New York was a grand feint and a return 
to New York was 
N o t  onlv was the mobi l i tv  o f  the Continental armv 
restricted t o  overland march, b u t  the in i t ia t ive  t o  s t a r t  
the remired marches was wreemwted bv the Bri t ish freedom t o  
move bv sea and concentrate a suwerior force a t  the s i t e  o f  
their choosing. Washington was frozen in-place in 
Morristown until intelligence could confirm British 
intentions. 
Sea power gave him a 
Militarily checkmated by Washington's 
3. Using the Options: Selecting an Assault Route 
The normal approach to Philadelphia by sea was along 
the Delaware River. Long an important seaport and 
40A.T. Mahan, Major Operations of the Navies i n  the War of 
American Independence, p. 5 2 .  
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shipbuilding center for the colonies, the Delaware River was 
dotted with well-placed forts and battlements to protect 
Philadelphia from assault by sea. Realizing this, the 
British bypassed the Delaware River and sailed instead to 
the headwaters of the Chesapeake Bay in Maryland with the 
intention of marching the remaining distance to 
Philadelphia. 41 
Learning of the British landfall, Washington marched 
quickly from Morristown to interpose his army between the 
British and Philadelphia. The battles of Brandywine Creek 
and Germantown failed to halt the British advance, and they 
entered Philadelphia on 25 September 177742. The lesson f o r  
ioint owerations i n  this wortion o f  the narrative i s  the 
ease w i t h  which Howe moved his armv, the manner i n  which he 
desianated the time and wlace o f  bat t le ,  and the speed w i t h  
which Washinaton w a s  forced t o  react i n  order t o  defend 
Philadelwhia. the cawital o f  the colonies. 
one further move on the part of the British to complete 
this joint operation. The supply line for the British 
army was stretched from Elkton, Maryland overland to 
Philadelphia and, as such, was susceptible to interdic- 
tion by colonial forces. 
Having taken the city of Philadelphia, there remained 
Lord Howe, after hearing of the success at 
Brandywine Creek, decided to 'move the fleet round 
to a proper anchorage for preserving a free 
communication with the army', and sailed for the 
Delaware. 43 
41W.M. James, The B r i t i s h  N a v y  i n  Adversity, p. 64. 
42A1fred Hoyt Bill, Valley Forge: The Making o f  an Army (New 
York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), 113. 
43W.M. James, The British N a v y  i n  Adversity, p. 65. 
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Again, the value of commanding the sea is made evident 
by the ease with which the British were able to supply their 
expeditionary forces a l o n g  the seaboard .  
which the British forced the Delaware River against fort and 
fireship is a study in joint operations. 
coordinated movements between ship and shore, though ably 
contested at times by a gallant defense, was successful in 
clearing  obstruction^^^. 
transport, and the British were ensconced in Philadelphia 
for the winter, while the colonists were exposed to-the 
elements at Valley Forge.45 
The manner in 
A series of 
The Delaware was secured for 
4.  Loss of Command Equals Loss of Options 
If there is a war between France and Britain, which 
seems to be inevitable, Philadelphia is an 
ineligible situation for the Army under Sir William 
Howe . 46 
The story of British withdrawal from Philadelphia is a 
short one when compared to the story of its occupation. 
difficulty that attended establishment of supply lines for 
the British army in Philadelphia foretells the demise of 
that occupation. In all, the British spent less than nine 
months in Philadelphia despite the arduous effort made to 
occupy it. There was no battle to liberate Philadelphia. 
Instead, the mere  t h r e a t  of French nava l  wower and i t s  
a n t i c i w a t e d  imwact on Bri t ish sea borne communicat ions  caused  
General  Howe t o  abandon P h i l a d e l w h i a .  This pattern repeated 
The 
44John W. Jackson, The Pennsy lvan ia  Navy: The Defense of the 
Delaware (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1 9 7 4 ) ,  120-  
280 .  
45W.M. James, The Brit ish Navy  i n  Adversity, p. 6 5 .  
46Dudley Knox, The Naval G e n i u s  of George Washington ,  p. 42, 
citing correspondence between Washington and Jeremiah Powell, May 
19, 1 7 7 8 .  
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itself in several critical operations during the 
Revolutionary War. 
From Saratoga to Toulon, and on to Philadelphia, the 
threat of French naval power traveled much faster than the 
ships themselves, but the impact was the same. No longer 
able to stretch supply-lines along inland waterways with 
impunity, the British were forced to consolidate their 
operations and take account of an opposing naval threat. 
Philadelphia was abandoned without a fight. More to the 
point, the British abandoned Philadelphia to avoid a 
tactical fight with the French that may prove to carry 
unacceptable strategic consequences due to attrition of 
fleet units. 
British at the start of the Philadelphia campaign were 
eliminated by the French fleet. 
preference would have been to go by water, but there were 
not enough transports to take the entire army and its 
equipment in a single trip47. 
trips gave the French fleet the opportunity to arrive in 
colonial waters. Accordingly, the decision was reached to 
march the army by land to New York, while the transports 
proceeded with the cannon, stores, and baggage by sea. The 
threat of intercept by the French fleet precluded transport 
of the army by sea due to the attendant risk. 
decision to minimize delay was well-taken, because the 
French arrived only days after the transports cleared the 
Delaware River bound for New York. The army's march 
overland to New York was ~neventful.~' 
The joint littoral options available to the 
For the actual evacuation of Philadelphia, the British 
Time spent in making two 
The British 
47David Syrett, The Royal Navy in American Waters, 1775-178 
(Brookfield, Vermont: Gower Publishing Company, 1989), pp. 95-9' 
48ibid., p. 4 2 .  
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The events surrounding the arrival and departure of the 
British from Philadelphia are of interest because they 
highlight the impact of naval power can have on the conduct 
of land campaigns. The character of the entire war changed 
dramatically with the entry of French naval power. Although 
the Continental Army continued to move largely by land, it 
was now able to coordinate its movements with the French 
fleet, and seize the initiative. No longer doomed to simply 
respond to British initiatives, Washington could now go on 
the offensive. His aim became to surround a British Army by 
land and sea to force surrender. As shown in the following 
paragraphs, Washington very nearly accomplished this feat in 
New York subsequent to the developments in Philadelphia. 
5 .  New Y o r k :  H a r b i n g e r  of Y o r k t o w n  
Arriving too late to trap any British units up the 
Delaware, Comte d'Estaing, the French commander, sought 
battle by following the British to New York. 
d'Estaing's vessels won at least temporary superiority over 
the British fleet which consisted of six sixty-fo~rs~~, 
three fifties, and six frigates5'. The French fleet 
consisted of two eighties, six seventy-fours, three sixty- 
fours, one fifty-four, and six frigates.51 
itself between his majesty's army and any threat from the 
sea. Admiral Howe's ship dispositions were most 
The arrival of 
The British fleet anchored at New York to interpose 
49The numbers-in this paragraph refer to cannon aboard each 
An association exists between the number of cannon on a ship. 
ship and its battle effectiveness resulting from concentration of 
fire. The numbers are provided to impart a rough estimate of the 
relative strengths of the belligerent fleets. 
50Frigate~ are vessels of less than 50 cannon. 
51W.M. James, The British Navy in Adversity, p .  98. 
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advantageous but the French fleet was sufficiently superior 
to overcome these defenses.52 
If the French got alongside, there was little hope 
for the British; but it was impossible for the 
French to evade the primary necessity of undergoing 
a raking fire, without reply, from the extreme 
range of their enemies' cannon up to the moment of 
closing. 53 
With the French pressing from seaward and Washington 
from the interior, the opportunity for a decisive joint 
victory presented itself to the allies. It-was not-to be, 
for the French were foiled in their approach by a sandbar 
that reportedly precluded transit by their heavier vessels. 
Perceiving that the sand-bar provided unassailable cover for 
the British fleet, d'Estaing left New York and eventually 
became involved in operations in Rhode Island. Subsequent 
fleet actions between the British and French were indecisive 
at the strategic level, and joint operations north of New 
York were of a similar nature. The French sailed for the 
West Indies on November 4 ,  1778  and the British fleet 
followed in early January 1779 .  Washington would have to 
wait for another opportunity to pinch the British army 
between his forces and the French fleet.54 
H. CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH 
1. Savannah 
One of the last movements of the British Army in 1778  
was to detach an expeditionary force from New York under 
"David Syrett, The Royal N a v y  i n  American Waters, p. 98.  
53A.T. Mahan, Major Operations of the Navies i n  the War of 
54D~dley Knox, The Naval Genius of George Washington, p. 51. 
American Independence, p. 67. 
, 
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Lieutenant Colonel Campbell, escorted by Admiral 
Hyde-Parker, to operate against the southern colonies. It 
was hoped that this campaign would release the latent 
loyalist sentiment believed to exist in abundance in that 
region. 
Savannah and it fell to the British on 29 December 1778.55 
D'Estaing and the French fleet returned to North 
America from operations in the West Indies in September 
1779. Unfortunately, his stay was short and militarily 
insignificant. He arrived with twenty ships of the-line and 
3,000 troops, but the fact that he was also in receipt of 
orders to return to France precluded any extended operations 
to support the colonial war effort.56 
Washington was again anxious to join forces and mount a 
joint assault on the British forces in New York, but 
d'Estaing had preferred to move on Savannah and took the 
fleet there. Communications were difficult between 
Washington and d'Estaing owing to distance, and coordination 
of forces suffered accordingly. D'Estaing was anxious to 
complete his business and return to France. At his urging, 
the French and Americans prematurely attacked Savannah on 9 
October 1779 and the assault was repulsed. The French fleet 
subsequently departed for Europe leaving widespread 
disappointment in North America. 
hold Savannah until the end of the war.57 
The first military objective of this expedition was 
The British continued to 
55W.M. James, The British Navy in Adversity, p. 158. 
56E.B. Potter, Sea Power: A Naval History, p. 40. 
57ibid. 
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2. Charleston North to Yorktown 
a. Advantages of Command 
With the departure of the French fleet in late 
1779 ,  the British resumed command of the sea and all the 
advantages that attended it. Again, the British were free 
to use mobility and surprise to take the initiative. The 
senior British commander, General Clinton, grew confident 
that Washington's army lacked the strength to successfully 
assault the British army in New York without the aid of 
naval power. He accordingly decided to divide the defenders 
at New York, and sent 8 , 0 0 0  troops with General Cornwallis 
to make the southern colonies the area of his principal 
effort in 1780.58  A correspondence from the British 
Minister of War to General Clinton, which had been captured 
by an American vessel, revealed that the general plan for 
the ensuing campaign was for Clinton to contain Washington's 
army in the northern quarter, while the British forces in 
the South would undertake the complete conquest of that 
region. 5 9  
1780,  and followed quickly by bringing all of South Carolina 
under British control and pushing into North Carolina.6o 
Washington was powerless to interfere with British military 
excursions in the south, lacking both the manpower and 
mobility to affect timely support. Insight into the 
situation faced by the Americans can be gained from the 
following entry in Washington's diary: 
General Cornwallis took Charleston in early May 
58ibid. , p. 43 .  
59D~dley Knox, The Naval Genius of George Washington, p. 83 
60E.B. Potter, ed., Sea Power: A Naval History, p. 43 .  
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Instead of having everything in readiness to take 
the field we have nothing; and instead of having 
the prospect of a glorious offensive campaign 
before us, we have a bewildered and gloomy 
defensive one, unless we should receive a powerful 
aid of ships, land troops, and money from our 
generous allies. 
Without naval power, the prospects for a decisive 
American victory in the coming campaign season were non- 
existent. The prospects for providing succor to General 
Greene in the southern colonies were equally grim. 
Southern forces under General Nathanial Greene fought back 
in the Carolinas and met with some success. Although 
defeated at Guiford Courthouse in North Carolina, Greene 
made it a costly victory for the British, and forced 
Cornwallis away from the interior to seek refuge and 
resupply from the fleet along the coast.62 
American 
Auain,  the absence of French naval  wower wrovided 
owtions and advantaues t o  the Br i t i sh  t h a t  could be neither 
matched nor wrecluded bv the Con t inen ta l  Armv a lone .  
moved from the costly victory at Guiford courthouse to 
Wilmington, N.C. on the Atlantic coast. After exchanging 
wounded for supplies and fresh troops, Cornwallis moved 
north from Wilmington into Virginia where he joined with a 
second British force, bringing his command to 7,000 
soldiers. 
The British expeditionary force under Cornwallis 
61Dudley Knox, The Naval Genius  of George Washington, p. 80- 
81. 
62ibid. 
6 3 E . B .  Potter, ed., Sea Power: A Naval History, p. 45. 
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b. Tbe Role of Higher Authority 
In addition to basic disagreements between 
Cornwallis in Virginia and Clinton in New York, a great deal 
of direction was sent from London which superseded the 
opinions of both generals. 
Yorktown was largely due to the confusion caused by 
divergent opinion within the leadership hierarchy. 
moves leading up to Yorktown 'a Study in Divided Command'. 
The British forces in America were now divided into-three 
major groups that could not support one another if the 
British lost naval superiority in American coastal waters.64 
necessary pre-condition for close cooperation between land 
and sea forces. 
demonstrate this coordination at this stage of the 
Revolutionary War. 
General Clinton in New York revealed a difference of opinion 
as to the proper disposition of British regulars within the 
colonies. The New York garrison had been weakened in order 
to support the campaign in the South which itself seemed no 
closer to a favorable conclusion for the British. With the 
return of the French fleet likely, Clinton wanted to 
strengthen the New York garrison, while Cornwallis preferred 
to pursue his southern campaign. 
apart to afford mutual support. 
The debacle that would occur in 
One American historian has called the British 
Smooth coordination within the leadership is a 
The British leadership failed to 
Correspondance between Cornwallis and 
These areas were too far 
The British situation in America had become 
essentially false, by the concurring effect of insufficient force and ex-centric-double- 
operations. Sent to conquer, their numbers now 
were so divided that they could barely maintain the 
defensive. Cornwallis was therefore ordered to 
occupy a defensive position which should control an 
64David Syrett, The Royal Navy  i n  American Waters, p. 172. 
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anchorage for ships of the line, and to strengthen 
himself in it. After some discussion, which 
revealed further disagreement, he placed himself at 
Yorktown, on the peninsula formed by the James and 
York Rivers. 
The decision to keep the British troops in the 
Chesapeake Bay area was made by neither of the British 
theater commanders. Instead, the decision was made in 
London, and the result constitutes an admonition against 
directing complex operations from a great distance. 
Upon reaching Portsmouth, however, Cornwallis found 
later instructions to keep his whole force in the 
South. Clinton had issued these in consequence of 
directions from London against withdrawing any 
troops from Virginia, as the future main campaign 
was to be an advance northward from there.66 
From London came the order which put in place the 
first piece of the Yorktown puzzle. A sizable British army 
was ordered to maintain a position from which communications 
from the sea could be challenged. The fact that both the 
design for the next campaign and orders detailing the 
disposition of troops emanated from London in no small way 
contributed to the disaster that befell the British in 
Yorktown. 
It was an odd circumstance that officials in 
England, who could not possibly keep up with the 
American situation, should be responsible for 
detaining at Yorktown, where Cornwallis then went, 
an army of sufficient size to make its capture a 
decisive end to the whole war.67 
65A.T. Mahan, Major Operations of the Navies in the War of 
66Dudley Knox, The Naval Genius of George Washington, p. 8 8 .  
67ibid., pp. 88-89. 
American Independence, p. 175 .  
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c. Major Factors at the Battle of Yorktom 
The first factor in the battle of Yorktown was the 
placement of a British Army in such a position that its 
communications could be threatened from the sea. From the 
perspective of the Colonists, there was a host of other 
factors that had to be precisely coordinated in order to 
take advantage of the exposed British position. The 
integration of these factors into a single force converging 
on Yorktown stands as a remarkable example of 
joint/combined/littoral warfare to this day; The process by 
which these forces were brought together is summarized 
below. 
(1) General Lafayette's Army. Since its 
arrival in Virginia, Cornwallis's Army had been skirmishing 
with a Colonial force of 5,000 composed mostly of raw 
militia. When the British occupied Yorktown, the Colonists, 
under the command of General Lafayette, enclosed the British 
on the landward side and kept that force under observation. 
This prevented unobserved movement, it cut-off supply lines 
from the interior, if cut-off escape to the interior, and it 
forced supply from the sea.68 
forces began in early August 1781 as the French fleet under 
Admiral de Grasse departed the West Indies to rejoin the war 
in North America. On 13 August, de Grasse departed the West 
Indies with twenty-seven ships of the line instead of the 
fourteen expected by British naval planners69. 
had been expected to divide his fleet and use fourteen of 
( 2 )  French Naval Forces. The movement of 
De Grasse 
68E.B. Potter, ed., Sea Power: A Naval History, p. 45. 
69Charle~ Lee Lewis, Admiral D e  Grasse and American 
Independence (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1945), 
95-156.  
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the line on escort duty to accompany an important convoy 
back to Europe. Instead, he delayed that convoy and arrived 
on 30 August in the Chesapeake Bay with all twenty-seven 
men-of-war and clear naval superiority over the British.70 
The troops brought by de Grasse were immediately disembarked 
and joined Lafayette's force, bringing that army to a total 
of 8,000 
The decision to keep the French fleet intact 
proved critical in the outcome of the overall Yorktown 
operation. It established allied naval superiority-and 
eventually won command of the sea. At last, Washington had 
the naval superiority for which he had pleaded so earnestly, 
and he was ready to undertake the vigorous and decisive 
joint offensive operations for which he had held his army in 
readiness above New York for more than three 
( 3 )  Movement of Allied Armies. A French army 
of 5,000 troops under Rochambeau had marched to New York 
from Newport to join Washington's forces already there. On 
August 14, and in possession of the news of de Grasse's 
intention to move the French fleet to the Chesapeake area, 
the combined American-Franco army faced a challenging march 
south to Yorktown. The need to deceive General Clinton at 
New York and to guard certain strategic positions limited 
the size of this combined army to 6,500 troops.73 
7oWilliam James Morgan, "The Pivot Upon Which Everything 
Turned: French Naval Superiority That Ensured Victory at 
Yorktown, 'I Naval Historical Foundation Publication, 1981, 
(reprinted from The Iron Worker, Spring 1958, Lynchburg Foundry). 
71D~dley Knox, The Naval Genius of George Washington, p. 96. 
72ibid., p. 91. 
73E.B. Potter, ed., Sea Power: A Naval History, p. 45. 
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The most expeditious route included crossing 
the Delaware River north of Philadelphia, then marching to 
the headwaters of the Chesapeake at Elkton, Maryland to 
continue the journey by water. Some French ships were 
placed in the mouth of the York River to guard against the 
exit of British ships which might seriously interfere with 
the safe movement of Washington's army down the Chesapeake 
Bay.74 In addition, several French ships were placed in the 
James River to preclude the escape of Cornwallis's force to 
the These precautions to protect armies moving by 
sea stand in stark contrast to Washington's earlier risk in 
transporting troops from Boston to New York on a sea 
commanded by the British. 
to secure the York and James Rivers, and his boats with a 
large part of his crews were absent while landing troops, 
leaving his fleet seriously undermanned. De Grasse was to 
face the British with 24  ships of the 
a wrice. The French waid f o r  the benef i ts  of joint warfare 
by sacrif icinu a deuree of wrewaredness f o r  the wurelv naval 
bat t le  t h a t  was takinu shawe. 
( 4 )  British Naval Forces. Unlike the French, 
the decision made by the British in the West Indies prior to 
arrival in the Colonies was to split the fleet. Admiral 
Rodney took to England the ships that needed repair and 
refitting, leaving 14 ships of the line under the command of 
De Grasse had detached four ships of the line 
The advantaue uained i n  joint warfare came a t  
74Dudley Knox, The Naval  Genius o f  George Washington, p. 96 
75ibid. I 
Admiral Hood77. Hood arrived in New York on August 28 after 
looking in vain for the French fleet in the Chesapeake Bay 
and Delaware River. There, his ships came under the command 
of Admiral Graves, the senior naval officer present. 
Anticipating an attempt by De Barras's Newport squadron to 
join de Grasse, the British got underway from New York to 
intercept it and defeat the French naval forces 
individually. 78 
entrance to the Chesapeake before sighting any French ships. 
It was not De Barras's squadron that they saw however, but 
De Grasse's fleet. The French had been expecting De Barras, 
and so had the British. 
the British less pleasantly, given the large superiority 
which confronted them.79 
The British fleet headed south and made the 
Both sides were equally surprised; 
Summarizing: 
Hood had assured Graves that De Grasse probably had 
only twelve ships, so that their combination of 19 
ships was more than enough for victory. In the 
meantime, De Grasse rounded Cape Henry, anchored at 
Lynnhaven Bay, landed 3000 French troops, sent 
boats up the Chesapeake to assist Washington and 
Rochambeau, and detached two pairs of ships to 
block the James and York Rivers and cooperate 
directly with the Allies forces present under 
Lafayette. If Cornwallis was startled to find 
himself under siege and cut off from the sea, 
77Thomas J. Fleming, Beat  the L a s t  Drum: The Siege of 
Y o r k t o m ,  1781 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963), 96-126. 
78E.B. Potter, ed., The Uni t ed  S t a t e s  and World Seapower 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955), p. 
113. 
79D~dley Knox, The Naval Genius  of George Washington,  p. 96. 
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Graves was overwhelmed on a September morning to 
stumble upon de Grasse's whole fleet rather than a 
part. 8 o  
This citation summarizes the events that 
determined the placement and composition of forces in 
Yorktown before the battle started. Highlights of that 
battle follow. 
d. The Battle of Yorktom 
Hostilities began with a naval battle off the 
Virginia Capes on 5 September 1781. 
action off the Capes was access to the Chesapeake Bay, and 
subsequently Cornwallis's flank. 
the day at sea, then retreat, reinforcement, or resupply 
were options available to Cornwallis through secure lines of 
communication. If the French prevailed off the Capes, then 
Cornwallis would be forced to deal with: colonial ground 
forces collecting to his rear, hostile naval forces in 
front, and no means of retreat, reinforcement, or resupply. 
fleets out to sea and awav from the stratecric objective-- 
Cornwallis. The action on the first day was furious with 
significant damage sustained by both the French and British 
forces. Though the fleets remained in visual contact for 
two days after the initial battle, neither attacked. On the 
morning of the ninth of September, De Barras's squadron 
arrived from Newport while the two battle fleets were still 
off the Virginia Capes. 
recognized the situation, proceeded into the Chesapeake Bay, 
and anchored in a position that eliminated Cornwallis's 
The prize in this fleet 
If the British had carried 
The battle off the Virginia Capes drew both battle 
De Barras's force immediately 
80ibid., p. 114. 
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options. De Grasse joined de Barras at anchor the next day, 
bringing the strength of his fleet to 3 6  of the line." 
When the British found the French at anchor inside 
the Chesapeake Bay, they had no alternative but to return to 
New York, repair battle damage, and return with 6,000 troops 
to attempt a rescue of Cornwallis. This turnaround required 
ten days and the British force returned to the mouth of the 
Chesapeake with 23  of the line on 26 October. Cornwallis, 
after losing two of his outer redoubts and failing in an 
attempt to escape across the York River, had already 
surrendered on the 19th of October.82 
The loss of a second army in America by the 
British was a stunning blow, and it ended, for all practical 
purposes, the American Revolutionary War. Lord North 
announced the resignation of his ministry. George I11 
seriously considered abdicating. The Marquis of Rockingham 
formed a new government friendly to America and at once sent 
an emissary to Paris to discuss peace terms with Franklin.83 
played by the interaction of land and sea forces in bringing 
the War to this surprising conclusion. 
The paper now turns to an analysis of the role 
"E.B. Potter, ed., Seapower: A Naval History, p. 47-49. 
82ibid., p. 48.  
83ibid., p. 49 .  




The purpose of this chapter is to focus attention on 
episodes from the previous chapter in which changes in the 
balance of naval power between the belligerents influenced 
the manner in which the land campaign proceeded. 
B. OVERVIEW 
This chapter looks at salient developments in each of 
the campaigns presented in Chapter 111, to include: the Lake 
Champlain waterway (LCW) , Boston, New York, Philadelphia, 
and Yorktown. In each case, an attempt is made to associate 
the independent (change in naval condition) and dependent 
(change in land campaign) variables. From this association, 
guidelines for influencing the land campaign from the sea 
are established. 
C. THE LAKE CHAMPLAIN WATERWAY 
1. Independent Variable 
Control of communications on Lake Champlain, held by 
the Colonists early in the War, was won by the British late 
in 1776 as a result of a hard-fought naval battle. This 
change in control between belligerents is the independent 
variable. 
2. Dependent Variable 
Improvements in transport and logistics for invading 
armies is the dependent variable that resulted when the 
British won control of communications. 
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3. Discussion 
a. The Nature of Inland Communications 
(1) The Status Quo Tends to Endure. What 
distinguishes the LCW campaign from the other cam-paigns of 
the Revolutionary War is its strongly inland character. The 
primary objective of inland naval power, like that of 
oceanic naval power, is the control of communications. 
There is, however, a difference between inland and oceanic 
control of communications. That difference stems from the 
difficulties inherent to placing naval vessels on inland 
waters. The more inaccessible the inland sea, the more 
l i k e l v  i t  i s  t h a t  the s t a t u s  QUO naval condition w i l l  remain 
in-wlace. The additional access obstacles facina a 
challenae to  command on an inland sea reauires a 
commensurate increase i n  the resources to  achieve the 
objective. The resul t  i s  t h a t  control of communications 
tends to  be a more wermanent condition on the inland sea 
than t h a t  on the oceans. 
In the case of the LCW, reinforcements and 
replacements could not be sailed to the battle area, but had 
to be built on the lake. This impediment applied equally to 
each of the belligerents, and each took a turn building a 
lake flotilla. Once the British established control of 
communications on Lake Champlain, a large and local Colonial 
construction effort was required in the wilds to challenge 
that control. Due to a paucity of resources, the British 
were all but assured of long-term control of communications 
along the waterway once it was established. 
aspect of warfare along an inland waterway that distin- 
guishes it from oceanic warfare is its ability to penetrate 
hostile territory. Traditionally, naval power wins coastal 
access which can be used as a base to support land campaigns 
( 2 )  Penetrating the Landmass. Another 
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into the interior. Supply lines for the subsequent campaign 
are vulnerable at any point the defenders can concentrate. 
Naval power on an inland waterway however, penetrates into 
interior. Not only can the waterway bring supplies closer 
to the battlefield, but the supply lines are secure as long 
as the waters are commanded. The dual  advantacres of closer 
deliverv and s e c u r e  l ines  which r e s u l t  from w e n e t r a t i o n  of 
the landmass make control of i n l a n d  waterwavs m i l i t a r i l v  
d e s i r a b l e .  
b. Using the Communications 
The British failure to prevail in this northern 
campaign after winning control of the LCW suggests that 
control of communicat ions i s  not s u f f i c i e n t  i n  i t s e l f  t o  
a s s u r e  victorv. It is a facilitator rather than a 
guarantor. The following paragraphs provide plausible 
explanations for the failure of the British to prevail in 
the LCW campaign despite the advantages initially acquired 
at such great effort. 
naval control of communications very difficult. In fact, 
the same features that favored long-term control of the LCW 
for the British also made it difficult to fully exploit it. 
The LCW was not a continuous, uninterrupted waterway. There 
exists a set of impassable rapids in the Richelieu River 
which joins the St. Lawrence River and Lake Champlain. In 
addition, a stretch of wilderness separated Lake George from 
the upper Hudson River. Had these land barriers been 
absent, and had the British been able to sail throughout the 
hostile interior of North America to supply and transport 
their armies, the critical Colonial victory at Saratoga 
would have been far less likely. 
Those portages affected the progress of the war in 
the following manner. To begin, the rapids in the Richelieu 
The creocrrawhv of the LCW made exploitation of 
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River critically delayed the British advance from Canada 
onto Lake Champlain. The British were forced to build 
vessels on the lake to match the Colonial flotilla already 
in place. Without these rapids, the British had only to 
sail onto the Lake with the same vessels used in the relief 
of Quebec. This construction delay, together with the delay 
caused by the onset of winter, pushed the British advance 
into the next year. 
Army to prepare defenses ahead of the expected line-of- 
advance of the invaders. This delay ultimately resulted in 
the capture of an entire British Army at Saratoga the 
following year, and the entry of Britain's historic European 
enemies into the war. 
That time was used by the Continental 
The portage between Lake George and the Hudson 
River also played and important part in the British defeat 
at Saratoga. Throughout the war, the North American 
interior was a hostile environment for the British, and the 
only exception was found in controlling inland waterways. 
Whenever the British ranged inland from the coast, or left 
the protection of the inland waterways, their military 
strength was quickly sapped and diminished in the 
countryside. 
military efficiency by the British Army itself, but the 
fragile lines of communication that supported it through the 
wilderness. As the British Army made portage between Lake 
George and the Hudson River, it met dogged resistance from 
local militia and eventually Colonial regulars. In a 
desperate attempt to gather supplies, a 700 man British 
detachment was lost just prior to the debacle at Saratoga. 
colonies was an enlightening one for the British. 
Conclusions that would determine the future of the war were 
drawn from the LCW campaign. The conclusions drawn by the 
The key vulnerability was not a lack of 
This experience in the wilds of the northern 
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British with respect to the interaction of land and sea 
forces is summarized below: 
Due t o  the hos t i le  nature o f  the countrvside 
durina the Revolutionary War, Bri t ish advantaaes from naval 
power ended a b r u w t l v  a t  the waterline. saltv or fresh.  T h i s  
forced the Brit ish t o  remain almost exclusively on the coast 
f o r  both aarrison d u t v  and camwaiuninu because i t  f a c i l i -  
tated loa i s t i c s .  Tha t  l oo i s t i c s  advantaue however reauires 
emosure t o  the sea: which eauates t o  an emosed f lank when 
the enemv commands t h a t  sea. 
c .  Local Versus Distant Command 
Throughout the Revolutionary War, British generals 
and admirals complained of command interference from superi- 
ors in London. This resulted in confusion at the highest 
levels of command in prosecuting the war. Campaigns were 
often simultaneous but "non-concentric"l in that they were 
disjointed and in no way mutually-supporting. Even major 
campaign objectives were sometimes misunderstood by the very 
field generals responsible for their accomplish-ment. This 
confusion can be traced to conflicting guidance issued by 
distant authority. The following citation identifies 
distant authority as a major source of failure for the LCW 
campaign. 
The result of these orders, proposals, and counter- 
proposals was that Burgoyne received definite 
orders to advance southward from Ticonderoga to 
meet Howe whose proposals to move South also had 
'Alfred Thayer Mahan, Major Operations of the Navies i n  the 
War o f  American Independence (London: Sampson Low & Co. , 1913) , 
p. 46. 
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been approved. The operations were doomed to 
failure before a shot was fired.2 
The "orders, proposals, and counter-proposals" 
refers to inconsistent orders issued from London concerning 
the desired objectives for campaigns in America. The 
problem with the orders received by the British generals is 
that Burgoyne, advancing south from Lake George, had 
expected to rendezvous with Howe's forces along the Hudson 
as they moved north from New York City. Howe's expectations 
were quite different because he received orders directing 
his forces south to Philadelphia. As stated above, the 
operations were doomed to failure before a shot was fired. 
General Carleton remarked after the surrender at 
Saratoga: 
This unfortunate event . . .  will prevent Ministers 
from pretending to direct operations of war in a 
country at three thousand miles distance, of which 
they have so little knowledge as not to be able to 
distinguish between good, bad, or interested 
advices, or to give positive orders upon matters 
which, from their nature, are ever on the change.3 
This issue of effective command hierarchy and 
effective control of forces does not relate specifically to 
the interaction of land and sea forces. It does, however, 
affect those interactions in a broader sense. The 
admonitions of General Clinton speak to timeless problems in 
civil-military relations that are applicable even today, and 
for that reason they are included in this discussion. They 
are considered-further in the final chapter. 
2W.M. James, The Br i t i sh  N a v y  i n  A d v e r s i t y :  A S t u d y  of the 
War American Independence (London: Longmans, Green and Co . , 
1933), p. 56. 
3ibid., p. 61. 
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D. THE BOSTON CAMPAIGN 
1. The Independent Variable 
Command of the sea did not change hands between 
belligerents during the Boston campaign, but there was a 
more subtle change in naval conditions with significant 
consequences. The change in naval condition that occured 
was the creation of a naval force by George Washington. 
2. The Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable was indirect, took time to 
develop, and was therefore not observable during the Boston 
campaign. It revealed itself in the ability of the 
Continental Army to use a sea commanded by the British to 
occupy New York City ahead of the enemy. 
reflected in the continuing ability of the Colonies to prey 
on British merchants and conduct commerce of their own. 
It is also 
3. Discussion 
Washington was faced with the frustration of watching 
the British in Boston regularly receive war supplies by sea, 
while his own forces were desperately short of both food and 
munitions. To correct this problem, Washington turned to 
the sea and commissioned raiders and privateers to prey on 
the British supply lines. The privateers were a small force 
and in no way threatened to sever the enemy's vital supply 
lines. The British in Boston continued to receive regular 
support from London. The booty collected by Colonial 
privateers was a welcome relief for Washington's forces, but 
were insufficient to change the balance of military power 
alone. The most significant affect that the privateers had 
on the course of the war was to threaten supply lines and 
thereby force the British to better protect the valuable 
troop transports and supply ships bound for the colonies. 
This diluted British naval strenuth available for owerations 
alonu the eastern seaboard, diminishinu effective exercise 
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of command of the sea. 
to use the sea, albeit at great risk. One example of this 
surreptitious use of the sea occurred when the Continental 
Army sailed from New London to New York City, arriving to 
take-up defensive positions ahead of the British Army. 
the British been able to deny use of the sea to the 
Continental Army and forced them to march to New York, the 
British Army would certainly have arrived first and have had 
the advantage of the defensive. 
direct influence u ~ o n  the land camDaicrn bv distractina the 
Brit ish f l e e t  and therebv crrantinu a deuree of mobili tv bv 
sea t o  the Continental Armv a s  well a s  some commerce. 
The colonists were thereby permitted 
Had 
In this way, a s m a l l  urouw of privateers had an in -  
E. THE CAMPAIGN FOR NEW YORK 
1. The Independent Variables 
a .  Phase One 
Phase one in the campaign for New York started 
with the actual battle for the city in August, 1776, 
ends a year later when the British sent troops to occupy 
Philadelphia in 1777. During this phase, there was no 
change in naval condition between belligerents, hence no 
independent variable. Nevertheless, this phase displayed 
certain interactions between navies and armies that are 
instructive and are therefore discussed below. 
and 
b. Phase Iko 
The second phase occured after the British evacu- 
ate Philadelphia and return to New York. 
variable for phase two is the change in naval supremacy that 
accompanied the entry of France into the war. 
The independent 
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2 .  The Dependent Variables 
a .  Phase One 
Without an independent variable with which to 
establish linkage, the dependent variable becomes trivial. 
What is of interest are the specific advantages made 
available to military commanders as a result of command of 
the sea. The primary advantages were mobility in the lit- 
toral and initiative in battle. They are discussed below. 
b. Phaee Two 
The dependent variable in phase two is the most 
telling of the war. It consisted of a complete metamor- 
phosis in the character of Washington's forces: the 
Continental Army abruptly changed from the hunted to the 
hunter. Thereafter, opportunities were sought to pinch a 
large British force on the coast between the Continental 
Army and the French Navy. 
operation even-tually ended the War at Yorktown. 
This type of joint/combined 
3 .  Discussion 
a .  Phase One 
(1) A Missed Opportunity. As stated, there 
was no significant change in naval condition associated with 
this period of the war. 
of naval supremacy along the Atlantic seaboard throughout 
this interval. 
naval supremacy and the struggle for command of the sea per 
se. Instead, tt goes' to the intended fruits of that 
struggle, the exercise of command. The British had high and 
low points in their exercise of command during phase one in 
New York, and each had ramifications for the land campaign. 
British was a masterful display of mutual support between 
the Army and Navy. While awaiting reinforcements, General 
Howe sent frigates up the Hudson on lengthy patrols to 
The British enjoyed a clear margin 
What is instructive in this case goes beyond 
The attack on New York City itself by the 
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reconnoiter and find the best points for a follow-on 
assault. Once the attack commenced, armies were landed 
under the guns of British men-of-war which anchored close-in 
and fired with great effect. 
that comprise New York City was well coordinated between the 
two services. 
on New York City occurred in the closing moments of that 
battle. 
with their backs to a swift tidal stream nearly a mile wide, 
the British failed to close the trap4. The Continental Army 
was permitted to escape under cover of darkness despite the 
strong likelihood that its capture would have ended the 
rebellion and the War. 
The advance along the islands 
The only conspicuous failure in the assault 
With the Continental Army facing superior numbers 
The excellence in coordination by the British 
forces in taking New York is overshadowed by the missed 
opportunity. I t  i s  axiomatic t o  sav t h a t  an outnumbered 
enemy should have his l i ne  o f  retreat watched carefullv.  
Nevertheless, the Brit ish d i d  not do i t  and th i s  fa i lure  to  
coordinate land and sea forces resulted i n  a missed 
opwortunitv t o  end the war on their  terms. 
command includes mobility as one of its primary advantages. 
This mobility extends beyond the simple movement of supplies 
and reinforcements. It also has implications for the 
maneuver of troops in in i t ia t ing  attacks in previously 
uncontested areas. It permits the temporary concentration 
o f  forces to seize objectives in widely separated geographic 
areas that are connected by navigable waters. The ability 
of the belligerent holding command to concentrate forces 
(2) The Value of Initiative. Exercise of 
4A.T. Mahan, Major Operations of the Navies i n  the War of 
American Independence, p. 4 3 .  
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over wide areas leaves the defender in a quandary as to the 
proper disposition of his forces. This robs the defender of 
the initiative and forces him to wait for intelligence on 
enemy movements before marching troops to the defense of an 
area. 
awaiting the arrival of the British in New York. Once the 
British Army had evacuated Boston, Washington could not be 
sure of their destination. He guessed New York because of 
his superb grasp of strategic principles, but the British 
were almost as likely to proceed up the Hudson River, land 
in Philadelphia, or even return to Boston. 
risk his Army on an "enemy sea" but he had no recourse but 
to move it to New York on a hunch. That the hunch proved 
correct is to his credit, but it does not diminish the 
military disadvantage he faced as a result of the enemy's 
ability to exercise command of the sea. 
Alternatively, the advantages inherent to 
command of the sea were demonstrated by General Howe toward 
the end of phase one in New York. The Continental Army had 
invested the heights overlooking Morristown in a pivotal 
position that simultaneously flanked British advances by 
land either up the Hudson Valley or south to Philadelphia. 
Storming the heights was an unattractive option f o r  the 
British due to the high casualties that would likely be 
suffered. 
sea, and sailed past Washington's well-positioned forces, up 
the Chesapeake Bay to Philadelphia. 
Morristown and march south to give battle practically at the 
time and place of Howe's choosing. 
Washington experienced this quandary while 
Not only did he 
Howe used his mobility advantage on the littoral 
The Continental Army 
I was forced to abandon its advantageous position in 
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This phase of the campaign for New York 
suggests the following: The i n i t i a t i v e  i n  the land camwaian 
and the owtion f o r  o f f ens i ve  owerations tended t o  ao t o  the 
bell iaerent commandina the l i t t o r a l  sea. 
b. Phase Two 
The dynamic naval episode that separates phases 
one and two of the New York campaign was the addition of 
French naval power to the wartime equation. Upon arrival at 
the mouth of the Delaware River in the summer of 1778, Comte 
d'Estaing enjoyed immediate naval superiority over the 
British. 
already marched the Continental Army. At this time, the new 
allies were clearly on the offensive. 
anxious to coordinate an attack on the British garrison in 
New York with the newly acquired naval capability. An 
inferior British fleet and a sandbar were all that stood 
between d'Estaing's naval units and an exposed British 
position. This was to the opportunity that the allies 
missed. The sandbar was cited as the reason that the French 
abandoned the attack and sailed instead to Rhode Island. 
much a failure to coordinate land and sea forces in battle. 
The missed opportunity was the result of a decision, good or 
bad, that the proper circumstances for battle had not yet 
presented themselves. What is instructive about phase two 
is the change in naval condition between the belli-gerents 
and the attendant affect it had on the land campaign. 
Previouslv l imited t o  reswondina t o  Br i t i sh  i n i t i a t i v e s ,  the 
Continental Armv now stalked Bri t ish forces whenever the 
French Fleet was available f o r  io in t  owerations. As i n  
phase one o f  the New York camwaian, the i n i t i a t i v e  and the 
owtion f o r  the o f f ens i ve  aaain favored the bell iaerent t h a t  
commanded the l i t t o r a l  sea. 
He pursued them to New York where Washington had 
Washington was 
In this case, the missed opportunity was not so 
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F. THE CAMPAIGN FOR PHILADELPHIA 
1. Independent Variable 
The independent variable for the Philadelphia campaign 
was the same as that of phase two of the New York campaign: 
the addition of French naval power to the Colonial war 
effort. 
2. Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable for the Philadelphia campaign 
focuses on the change in British behavior as they adjusted 
the land campaign in response to the loss of naval superi- 
ority. The impact was so dramatic that after an occupation 
of just nine months, the conquerors of Philadelphia 
abandoned that city without a fight. 
3. Discussion 
The attack and evacuation phases of the Philadelphia 
campaign highlight different facets of the interaction of 
sea and land forces. What again comes to the fore in both 
cases, however, is the advantage that accrues to military 
commander as a result of command of the sea. In this 
campaign, those advantages included the mobility and 
initiative already discussed in the New York campaign. 
Another phenomenon that is observed during the Philadelphia 
campaign is the variable size of the "target set"'. Each is 
discussed below as they pertain to the campaign. 
a. Mobility and the Assault Route 
British mobility by sea and the unique geographic 
circumstances of Philadelphia conspired to increase its 
5NOTE: "Target set" refers to the total number of strategic 
centers accessible to invaders. The size of the target set is 
diminished if targets along inland waterways are no longer 
accessible. The French challenge to British naval superiority 
effectively eliminated upriver operations for the British, thus 
diminishing the size of their target set. 
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vulnerability to attack by the British. 
by the Delaware River, it was also accessible by way of the 
Chesapeake Bay by adding a short march from Elkton, 
Maryland. 
bypassed the heavily fortified Delaware River in their 
attack on Philadelphia. 
the option to choose the route of assault. 
decision, General Howe was able to  exert a larae decree of 
control on the time, wlace, and circumstances of the bat t le  
for Philadelwhia. Again, the relationship between the naval 
conditions and the manner in which the land campaign 
proceeds is readily observable. 
Directly accessible 
The British opted for the latter route and 
With the advantage of mobility came 
With th i s  
b. The Target Set and Evacuation 
The most dramatic change in the fortunes of the 
British land campaign around Philadelphia occurred when the 
French entered the war. With never a sail in sight, the 
British preemptively evacuated Philadelphia due to the mere 
threat of French naval power. Due to a lack of reliable 
intelligence concerning the arrival time of the French 
fleet, the British were unwilling to risk troops at sea. 
Instead, the Army was marched from Philadelphia to New York, 
while equipment and supplies went by sea. The British Army 
was trailed and harassed throughout this march by Colonial 
forces. This episode points to the erosion of options 
available to the British Army in light of changing naval 
conditions. The need to evacuate was a function of the 
diminished size of the British target set. 
evacuation reflected changes in the naval condition. 
military decision gone bad by changing conditions. 
decision was made to occupy Philadelphia, the surrender of 
the British Army under General Burgoyne at Saratoga had not 
yet occurred and undisputed command of the sea seemed a fact 
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The manner of 
The need to evacuate was the result of a good 
When the 
of war for the foreseeable future. With undisputed command, 
upriver cities and other strategic centers were directly 
accessible to British forces. The British could depend on 
secure lines of communication if the routes were on oceans 
or continuously navigable waterways. Such was the case with 
Philadelphia when the decision was made to occupy it. 
French naval power in North American waters. Command of the 
sea was challenged and seaborne communications were no 
longer secure. With a hosti le interior landmass as- the onlv 
a1 ternative source of suwwlv, British uwriver owtions were 
immediatelv curtailed bv the French. Threatened communi- 
cations were reswonsible f o r  the B r i t i s h  evacuation o f  
Ph i lade lwh ia  w i t h  never a shot f i red .  The British were 
forced to consolidate their operations and diminish the size 
of their target set. The association between changing naval 
conditions and its influence on the land campaign is direct 
and readily observable in this episode. 
Philadelphia is a lso  indicative of limited options ashore 
resulting from changing naval conditions. Having previously 
enjoyed unrestricted mobility by sea, the British Army opted 
to march to New York from Philadelphia. 
harried by Colonials throughout, required more time, was 
logistically inconvenient, and damaged morale. It was 
clearly not the preferred option. But the threat of French 
naval power in the vicinity made transport of armies by sea 
a dangerous proposition with war-ending potential. 
m o b i l i t v  and convenience of moving armies bv sea had been 
eliminated through a challenge t o  naval suwremacv. 
But that situation changed with the arrival of 
The manner in which the British evacuated 
This march was 
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G. THE YORKTOWN CAMPAIGN 
1. The Independent Variable 
The independent variable in the Yorktown campaign was 
the change in naval control of the anchorage off Yorktown 
that closed the noose on Cornwallis's encampment. 
2. The Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable was the surrender of the British 
Army under Cornwallis on October 19, 1781. 
3. Discussion 
a. Gambit in Charleston 
General Cornwallis's Army arrived in Yorktown via 
a circuitous path that went by sea from New York to 
Charleston, thence north by land to Yorktown. The reason 
for this expedition was that British authorities sincerely 
believed that latent loyalist sentiment in the South would 
facilitate conquest of that entire region. This 
expeditionary thinking by the British however, is 
inconsistent with practices established in the aftermath of 
the Philadelphia evacuation. 
their operations and drawing down on expeditionary opera- 
tions. This consolidation was due to the fact that the 
French fleet significantly increased the risk of distant 
waterborne support of armies. 
reevaluated this predisposition were twofold and related: 
first, the potential gain was justified by the degree of 
risk involved in expedition; second, the French fleet had 
departed the Atlantic seaboard bound for home or winter 
operations in the West Indies. It was in antici-pation of 
the return of the French fleet to North American waters that 
orders were issued for Cornwallis to fortify a position at 
Yorktown and await either evacuation or reinforcements. & 
a l l  indications then. emeditions and of fensive camwaiuns bv 
After Philadelphia, the British were consolidating 
The reasons that the British 
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the British were closelv linked t o  the movements o f  the 
French f l e e t ,  occurrina onlv  i n  i t s  absence. 
b. The Battle of Yorktown 
Though there was a grand fleet confrontation off 
the Virginia Capes on 5 September 1781, this battle was 
significant only to the degree to which if affected communi- 
cations on the Chesapeake Bay. The critical element of the 
battle at Yorktown was the encirclement of Cornwallis's 
Army on all sides except to seaward. Victory would go to 
the belligerent controlling that seaward access to - 
Cornwallis's Army. 
they sailed easterly in a prolonged battle. 
squadron arriving from Newport moved quickly to cover 
Cornwallis's seaward flank in the absence of the battle 
fleets. De Barras's anchorage was later fortified by the 
remainder of the French fleet, and the British were forced 
to sail north to New York for repair and reinforcements. 
Their return was too late to save the surrounded army, and 
it was surrendered on 19 October 1781. 
The British may have lost sight of this fact as 
De Barras's 
The battle of Yorktown was the realization of 
Washington's long-held plan to coordinate the movements of 
the Continental Army and the French fleet jointly to isolate 
and capture a British Army along the coast. 
accomplished this feat in New York and was entirely success- 
ful at Yorktown. This battle epitomizes the manner in which 
naval power can.influence the conduct of the land campaign. 
With resupply and reinforcement, Cornwallis should have been 
capable of breaking-out by land and continuing his northward 
campaign. Enemv control o f  sea-lines o f  communication not 
onlv wrecluded this of fensive camwaiun. b u t  forced the sur-  






A. LESSONS FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 
In each of the episodes examined during the 
Revolutionary War, the impact of developments at sea was 
reflected in the conduct of the land campaign. In general, 
a sustained and purposeful exercise of command after it was 
gecured enabled a more aggressive and offensive land 
campaign. This offensive style of warfare stemmed from the 
ability to control passage on the littoral sea. Control of 
passage imparts to its possessor the advantages of: mobility 
of troops and hence the ability to concentrate; initiative 
to dictate the time and place of battle; access to strategic 
centers on the seaboard or along inland waterways; and the 
ability to surprise the enemy. 
Amply demonstrated in the early years of the American 
Revolutionary War is that command of the sea is not 
something possessed by a belligerent, but something that 
must be exercised if it is to be of any military 
significance. The advantages of mobility, initiative, etc., 
are available to the belligerent commanding the sea, but 
unless that command is actively exercised, these advantages 
are of no benefit. Furthermore, without the active exercise 
of command by the dominant naval power, the enemy may elect 
to risk seaborne operations to extract from the sea that 
which he can. The C,olonials did exactly this by preying on 
British merchantmen and moving the Continental Army on seas 
"commanded" by- the British. 
contention that naval superiority does not equate to command 
of the sea, and the capability to exercise command does not 
equate to the effective exercise of command. 
This fact supports the 
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B. LESSONS FOR TODAY 
Today, the roles are reversed for the United States. 
No longer the underdog in a struggle for independence, the 
United States is now the world's dominant military and naval 
power. With respect to the Revolutionary War then, it is 
the successes and failures of the British, rather than the 
Colonists, that currently provide the pertinent lessons for 
the United States. The United States is now more likely to 
engage a major contingency in which sea force must be 
applied aggressively and profitably. The following- 
paragraphs summarize lessons of the Revolutionary War with 
respect to the interaction of land and sea forces that 
continue to find application today. 
In 1775, command of the sea ended at the shoreline. 
Beyond that, the landmass was unfamiliar and inhospitable to 
invaders. That remains true today, but there is an 
additional qualification that further limits the advantage 
of command. Due to improvements in sea force systems since 
the time of the Revolutionary War, command of the sea can be 
readily disputed by defenders with land-based weapons 
systems. In consequence, command of the sea extends to the 
shoreline only when the defender lacks the ability to 
dispute it. Otherwise, command of the sea extends only to 
that point on the ocean where expeditionary forces are 
beyond the range of the defender's sensors and weapons. Due 
to recent proliferatzon trends, sea force systems such as 
attack aircraft, shore batteries, and anti-ship missiles, 
are available to virtually any nation determined to procure 
them'. 
'William D. Hartung, And Weapons f o r  A l l  (New York: 
HarperCollins, 1994), 155-198. 
96 
The British fleet was the world's finest, quantita- 
tively and arguably qualitatively, at the time of the 
Revolutionary War. However, due to the seemingly inevitable 
global interests of a first-rate power, that fleet was over- 
committed. 
with naval blockade, but the number of ships required to 
successfully employ this strategy was not available to 
theater commanders in North America. This shortage was 
exacerbated by the Colonial privateers, who forced the 
British to closely protect the long lines of communication 
from England. 
form of guerilla war at sea which the United States may face 
in the future. 
Britain had a potentially war-winning strategy 
The privateers of the Revolution practiced a 
The United States unquestionably owns the world's 
premier fleet today, but increasing global commitments and 
declining ship numbers have already resulted in extensions 
to planned deployment schedules. 
hostilities, modern diesel submarines and the ubiquitous 
missile patrol boats assume the role of the Colonial 
privateers by forcing the United States to closely protect 
distant supply lines. 
whether the United States has sufficient assets to support 
the "two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts" 
called for in the National Strategy'. In view of the 
consequences suffered by the British in the Revolutionary 
War, the United States today must avoid diminishing its 
naval power thrpugh overcommitment. 
Another admonition for the United States stemming from 
lessons learned by the British in the Revolutionary War 
In the event of 
Debate already surrounds issue of 
2President of the United States William Clinton, A National 
Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], 1994), 7 .  
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pertains to the issue of theater command. 
war, British commanders chaffed under the burden of conflic- 
ting orders arriving regularly from London. 
the United States in this area were apparent during the Viet 
Nam era, but Desert Storm proves that they are not 
insurmountable problems. Efforts must continue to prevent a 
reoccurrence. 
In closing, the United States has a rare opportunity to 
develop a systematic approach to influencing the land 
campaign . . .  From the Sea .  Unchallenged American dominance 
of the high seas enables pursuit of new naval objectives in 
the littoral area and into the landmass. New technologies 
are emerging and older ones are evolving that can be adapted 
to these new objectives. In the haste to develop effective 
methods of interaction between land and sea forces however, 
l e t  i t  not be f o r a o t t e n  t h a t :  f i rs t ,  command o f  the s e a  mus t  
precede a n v  other u s e  o f  nava l  wower: and second, command o f  
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